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Converging technologies' and markets pose major challenges to
incumbent telecommunications companies and national regulatory
authorities ("NRAs").3 Packet switched networking4 can provide a

1. For background on the impact of converging telecommunications and
information processing technologies see, e.g., International Telecommunication Union,
ITU
Internet
Report
2006,
digital life,
portions
available
at
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/publications/digitalife/index.html.
2. Telecommunications is defined as "the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received." Telegraphs, telephones, and
radiotelegraphs, 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). Telecommunications service means "the offering of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be
effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(46). The Communications Act defines telecommunications carrier as "any provider
of telecommunications services, except that such term does not include aggregators of
telecommunications services (as defined in section 226). A telecommunications carrier
shall be treated as a common carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in
providing telecommunications services, except that the Commission shall determine
whether the provision of fixed and mobile satellite service shall be treated as common
carriage." 47 U.S.C. § 153(44).
3. "The communications industry is in a time of unprecedented change.
Technological advances, converging business models, and the digitalization of services
create unparalleled opportunities and considerable challenges. Perhaps most important,
digital convergence is creating real benefits for consumers worldwide by increasing
competition among different platform providers....
Rapid convergence in technology has strained the existing legal and regulatory
regime. Unprecedented market changes have demonstrated that what worked in the past
may not be the right approach today. In the United States, we have made considerable
changes to our approach, working to establish a less-regulated environment that can adapt
more quickly to market changes. Oftentimes today, 'regulatory parity' does not mean
applying the old economic regulations to new entrants. Rather, 'regulatory parity' means
the elimination of legacy regulatory burdens on the incumbent. Regulation, Competition,
Telecommunications and Content" The Portuguese Association for Communications
Advancement Lisbon, Portugal, Remarks of FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin, 2006 WL
3343877 (November 16, 2006).
"In this era of convergence, we often hear that new technologies will bring
competition to markets currently dominated by incumbents. But what about when the
same company or companies dominate both the new and the old markets? Will a parent
company really allow a subsidiary to introduce products that cannibalize existing revenue
streams?" Implementation of section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, WT Docket No. 06-17 (Terminated), Eleventh Report,
Concurring Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, FCC 06-142, 2006 WL 2795449
(September 29, 2006).
4. "Packet switching, in computer networking and telecommunications, is the nowdominant communications paradigm in which packets (units of information carriage) are
routed between nodes over data links shared with other traffic. This contrasts with the
other principal paradigm circuit switching, which sets up a dedicated connection between
the two nodes for their exclusive use for the duration of the communication. Packet
switching is used to optimize the use of the bandwidth available in a network, to minimize
the transmission latency (i.e. the time it takes for data to pass across the network), and to
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single, but versatile medium for the delivery of many information,

communications and entertainment ("ICE") services. Most NRAs
have only begun to revamp the nature and type of regulation in light
of changed circumstances.5 Generally, NRAs have streamlined

telecommunications service regulation in light of actual or
prospective competition. These regulators have refrained from
subjecting Internet-carried
government oversight.

information

services'

to

significant

Core telecommunications service revenue streams, such as that
provided by basic wireline telephone services, have declined 7 as

increasing numbers of subscribers migrate to new options provided by
wireless carriers,8 cable 9 television companies and Voice over the
Internet Protocol ("VoIP") ventures.

°

Understandably incumbent

increase robustness of communication."
Wikipedia, Packet switching, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet switching.
5. See, e.g., International Telecommunication Union, What Rules for IP-enabled
NGN? Workshop (March 23-24, 2006), available at http://www.itu.int/osg/ngn/eventmarch-2006.phtml.
6. Information service is defined as "the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service." 47
U.S.C. § 153(20). "[T]he language and legislative history of [the Communications Act of
1996] indicate that the drafters.., regarded telecommunications services and information
services as mutually exclusive categories." Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11522 (1998); see also Vonage Holdings Corp. v.
Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm., 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 994, 1000 (2003) (applying the FCC's
dichotomy).
7. The FCC reports that in 2004 local exchange telecommunications revenues in the
United States declined to $85.92 billion from $86.474 billion in the preceding year with toll
services declining from $58.983 to $50.557 billion in the same period. Federal
Communications Commission, Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline
Competition Bureau, Trends in Telephone Service, Table 15.1 Telecommunications
Industry Revenues, (2005), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/
Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/trend6O5.pdf.
8. The FCC reports that in 2004 local wireless revenues increased from $85.254
billion to $95.503 billion in the previous year. Id.
9. Cable service is defined as: (A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i)
video programming, or (ii) other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if
any, which is required for the selection or use of such video programming or other
programming service. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6).
10. Voice over the Internet Protocol ("VolP") refers to the use of the Internet to
carry and deliver on a real time, immediate basis packets of data that correspond to a
voice conversation. VoIP services range in quality, reliability and price and can link both
computers and ordinary telephone handsets. For technical background on how VolP
works
see
Intel,
White -Paper,
IP Telephony
Basics, available at
http://www.intel.com/network/csp/resources/white-papers/407Oweb.htm;
Susan Spradley
and Alan Stoddard, Tutorial on Technical Challenges Associated with the Evolution to
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carriers have undertaken a major campaign seeking regulatory relief
that would remove real or perceived disincentives for new investment

in replacement lines of business." This relief would also establish
parity with unregulated ventures that offer competitive services. 2
In light of the financial stakes involved in the scope of regulation
applied

to

conventional,

so-called

legacy

services

and

new

information services," numerous organizations" have pursued a
VoIP, Power Point Presentation,available at http://www.fcc.gov/oet/tutorialU9-22-03-voipfinalslidesonly.ppt. See also, R. Alex DuFour, Voice Over Internet Protocol: Ending
Uncertainty and Promoting Innovation Through a Regulatory Framework, 13
COMLCON471 (2005); Stephen E. Blythe, The Regulation of Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol
in the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, 5 J. High Tech. L.
161(2005). In a short span of time, VoIP has evolved from a low quality hobby of
computer enthusiasts, who used the Internet as a medium to provide voice
communications between computers, to a near equivalent to conventional dial up
telephone service. VoIP provides consumers with access to lower cost services because of
technological efficiency in the use of the Internet's packet switched architecture and
reduced regulation imposed costs. Some VoIP service providers can avoid paying access
charges to local exchange carriers and making USF contributions. See Petition for
Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither Telecommunications
Nor a Telecommunications Service, Docket No. 03-45, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
19 FCC Rcd 3307 (2004).
11. The International Telecommunication Union reported that as of January 1, 2005
the United States ranked 16"' in broadband penetration measured in terms of number of
subscribers per 100 inhabitants. See International Telecommunications Union, ITU
at
available
Unit
Newsblog,
Policy
and
Strategy
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/newslog/ITUs+New+Broadband+Statistics+For+l+January+20
05.aspx. See Rob Frieden, Lessons From Broadband Development in Canada, Japan,
Korea and the United States, 29 TELECOMM POL'Y., No. 8, 595-613 (Sept. 2005).
Regulatory uncertainty and the overlay of existing telecommunications regulation may
have created disincentives for incumbent carriers to invest in broadband plant. On the
other hand, regardless of a real or perceived regulatory burden, incumbent carriers likely
can no longer rely on wireline services as the primary source of revenue.
12. "The existing regulatory framework was built around the concept that different
services were provided by different providers, without overlap. Thus, telephone
companies providing telephone service are regulated as common carriers under Title II of
the Communications Act of 1934 .... But, to the extent that [other] wireline networks can
deliver the same services to the consumer at the same quality, it is difficult to understand
why different technologies should trigger different regulatory treatment for the same
services." Antonia M. Apps & Thomas M. Dailey, Non-Regulation of Advanced Internet
Services, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 681, 682-683 (Summer 2000); see also, Rob Frieden, The
FCC's Name Game: How Shifting Regulatory Classifications Affect Competition, 19
BERKLEY TECH. L.J., No. 4, 1275-1314 (Fall, 2004); Rob Frieden, Regulatory Arbitrage
Strategies and Tactics in Telecommunications, 5 N.C. J. L.& TECH., No. 2, 227-275 (2004),
Rob Frieden,
available at http://www.jolt.unc.edulVol512/pdf/Frieden%20v5i2.pdf.
Adjusting the Horizontaland Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparisonof
the Traditionaland a New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J., No. 2, 207-250 (March
2003).
13. "Initial telecommunications regulatory reform has also been marked by
regulatory arbitrage, whereby network carriers would seek to take advantage of
inconsistent telecommunications regulations to sustain their businesses. Examples of early

2007]

NETWORK NEUTRALITY OR BIAS?

public policy agenda supporting deregulation and the eradication of

government oversight, including traditional regulatory over pricing,
interconnection and quality of service.15 These groups reject any view
that even as telecommunications becomes less regulated, a new
concept of "network neutrality"16 should force largely unregulated

regulatory arbitrage include international callback routines designed to take advantage of
excessive international accounting rates, and bypass facilities of Competitive Access
Providers - competing local exchange carriers, designed to avoid local exchange access
charges. Recent examples of regulatory arbitrage include IP telephony services designed
to avoid universal service charges, and reciprocal compensation terminating fees for
terminating calls to Internet Service Providers, designed to take advantage of the alleged
local nature of Internet traffic. Such regulatory arbitraging has been tacitly approved by
regulatory authorities, to encourage certain social policy agendas and to avoid political
obstacles that have favored existing monopoly network infrastructures." Benjamin
Lipschitz, Opportunitiesand Challenges in the Digital Era, 7-FALL MEDIA L. & POL'Y 14,
20 (Fall 1998).
14. See, e.g., The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Net Neutrality and Net Neutering
in a Post-Brand X World: Self-Regulation, Policy, Principles and Legal Mandates in the
Broadband Marketplace, (Dec. 29, 2005), available at http://www.pff.org/issuespubs/pops/popl2.29netneutrality.pdf; National Cable & Telecommunications Association,
Phone Companies and the Truth: A Bad Connection (March 14, 2006) (identifying several
"astro turf" consumer and academic organizations claiming independence despite serving
as
paid
mouthpieces),
available
at
http://www.ncta.com/pdf_files/
BellsMisleadingAmerica.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853 (2005) (reclassifying DSL from a common carrier
provided telecommunications service to a largely unregulated information service),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-150Al.doc. Review
of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98- 147, Report and Order and Order on
Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978 (2003),
corrected by Errata, 18 FCC Rcd 19020 (2003), partially vacated and sub nom., United
States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (USTA II), cert. denied, 125
S.Ct. 313, Order on Reconsideration, 19 FCC Rcd. 15,856 (2004), Further
Reconsideration, 19 FCC Rcd. 20, 293 (2004) (Triennial Review FTC Reconsideration
Order). In response to the D.C. Circuit's vacatur of certain Triennial Review Order
unbundling rules, the FCC issued an Interim Order and NPRM, setting forth a six-month
interim unbundling framework with respect to those network elements, and seeking
comment on permanent unbundling rules that would respond to the USTA II decision.
Unbundled Access to Network Elements; Review of the Section 251 Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 04-313, CC Docket
No. 01-338, Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd. 16,783 (2004); Order
on Remand, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, BroadbandDiscrimination,2 J. TELECOM
& HIGH TECH L. 141 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=388863; Barbara van
Schewick, Towards and Economic Framework for Economic Neutrality, paper presented
at the 33nd annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Arlington, Va.
(2005),
available
at
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/483/
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Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") to forego the option of offering
differentiated and tiered Internet services. Opponents of net
neutrality view the concept as jeopardizing operational and pricing
flexibility.17 Net neutrality advocates fervently argue that the Internet
cannot achieve maximum contributions to national productivity,
economic opportunity and innovation unless government ensures
end-to-end connectivity by foreclosing a balkanized or tiered

Internet."
van%20Schewick%20Network%20Neutrality%20TPRC%202005.pdf; Mark A. Lemley
and Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet
in the BroadbandEra, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).
17. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality
Regulation of the Internet, forthcoming 2 J. COMPT. L. & ECON. (2006) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=928582; Adam Thierer, Are 'Dumb
Pipe' Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Intergation, Net Neutrality, and the Network
Layers Model, 3 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 275 (2005); U.S. Internet Industry Assn.
Network Neutrality: Phantom Problem, Unintended Consequences (March 14, 2006),
available at http://www.usiia.org/pubs/NNPrimer.doc; Thomas M. Lenard and Randolph J.
May (Eds.), Net Neutrality of Net Neutering: Should Broadband Internet Services Be
Regulated (2006);
http://www/springer.com/west/home/economics/r+&+d?SGWID=440548-22-166923618-0; Raymond L. Gifford, The Internet Left Gets a Case of the Vapors,
The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress Snapshot, Rel. 2.15 (June 2006), available
at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2006/ps 2.15-internet-left.pdf.
18. See, e.g., United States Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, Prepared Statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet
Evangelist,
Google,
Inc.,
available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=1705&witid=4958.
"The Internet's open, neutral architecture has proven to be an enormous engine for
market innovation, economic growth, social discourse, and the free flow of ideas. The
remarkable success of the Internet can be traced to a few simple network principles-endto-end design, layered architecture, and open standards-which together give consumers
choice and control over their online activities." For background on a revised regulatory
regime that applies different degrees of government oversight based on the scope of
competition in each layer of service that blends telecommunications packet delivery with
intelligent networking, software applications and content see Richard S. Whitt, A
HorizontalLeap Forward:FormulatingA New Communications Public Policy Framework
Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (2004); Yochai Benkler,
From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable
Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000); [Scott Marcus, The Potential
Relevance to the United States of the European Union's Newly Adopted Regulatory
Framework for Telecommunications, Federal Communications Commission, Office of

Plans
and
Policy
Working
Paper
Series
No.
36
(July,
2002)]
http://www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html; Douglas Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model
for Telecommunications Policy (2002), unpublished
paper
available at
http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2002/95/LayeredTelecomPolicy.pdf; Kevin Werbach,
A Layers Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37 (2002); John T.
Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting Regulation From
the Bottom Up, 1 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 95 (2002); Phillip J. Weiser, Law and
Information Platforms, J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2002); Craig McTaggert, A

Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis (Dec. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.innovationlaw.org/cm/ilg2002/reading/layeredl.pdf;
Robert Cannon, The
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In tandem with efforts to shape public policy and public opinion,
incumbent carriers have recognized that declining revenue prospects
for traditional, core service require changed business plans and
strategies. Incumbent telephone companies now see upside financial
opportunities in providing broadband Internet access, video services
and VoIP singularly and as a bundle of services commonly referred to
as the "triple or quadruple play."' 9 Incumbents' responsiveness to
consumers' wants, needs and desires, and the willingness to embrace20
change comes across as a refreshing change to the "Bellhead
caricature of a corporate mindset lacking creativity, entrepreneurship
and marketing acumen.
However, the Bellhead mindset may not have perished entirely
as senior incumbent carrier managers have gone public with
provocative statements about net neutrality that represent
longstanding management philosophies, operating assumptions and
business strategies fashioned when the incumbent carriers primarily
provided voice telephony. As well, recent double digit billion dollar
mergers of incumbent telecommunications firms evidence a keen
interest in buying out competition in addition to investing in
innovations and new facilities. 2' Notwithstanding substantial
Legacy of the FederalCommunications Commission's Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM.
L.J. 167 (2003); Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontaland Vertical in Telecommunications
Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a New Layered Approach, 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 207 (2003).
19. See, e.g., Matt Richtel, It's Not Enough to Be Just a Phone Company, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Sec. C, p. 1 (February 19, 2004), available at http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/document?_m=fc005e879bfda64a00009c618b294e7c&_docnum=17&w
chp=dGLbVzz-zSkVb&_md5=88b9da3c07blda868d15202176609ba6.
20. Bellhead has been defined as a "person involved with telephone networks or
someone who thinks about networking from a circuit-switched point of view." PC
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopediaterm/
Encyclopedia,
Magazine
0,2542,t=Bellhead&i=38536,00.asp.
For background on the Bellhead and Nethead orientation see Rob Frieden, Revenge of the
Bellheads: How the Netheads Lost Control of the Internet, 26 TELECOM. POL'Y, No. 6, 125144 (Sep./Oct. 2002).
21. Recent mergers and acquisitions in the United States telecommunications
marketplace include AT&T's merger with BellSouth, FCC Approves Merger of AT&T
Inc. and BellSouth Corporation, News Release (rel. Dec. 29, 2006), available at
Verizon
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-269275Al.pdf;
Communications Inc. acquisitions of MCI, Inc., Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI,
Inc., Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, WC Docket No. 05-75,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd. '8433 (2005); the merger of wireless
carries Spring and Nextel, Applications of Nextel Communications, Inc. and Sprint
Corporation for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, WNT Docket
No. 05-63, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 13967 (2005); SBC
Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control,
WC Docket No. 05-65 Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18290 (2005).
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technological and market convergence that will force new strategies,
the senior managers of AT&T and Verizon have expressed rather
rigid traditionalist views on their companies' role in content delivery,
how these companies will price service, interconnect facilities and
recover costs.
Even in an environment where data transmission and the
Internet increasingly dominate, incumbent carrier managers still
appear to shape business strategies based on the expectation that they
can continue to make major operational and business decisions based
on the status quo. When operating networks primarily transmitted,
switched and routed voice telephone calls, an incumbent carrier could
identify who caused the carrier to incur costs, where traffic originated
and terminated and what volume of traffic a subscriber generated,
and who had responsibility for payment. When an Internet-centric
network dominates, carriers have far less ability to track cost causers,
particularly because content and conduit converge, and a number of
different business factors contribute to the generation of traffic
including advertiser-added content whose reception by consumers
pays for the creation and delivery of desired content.
Consumers look to Internet access as a seamless collection of
telecommunications capability, i.e., high speed bit transport, and
access to content. Additionally Internet traffic flows have both bursty
and asymmetric characteristics unlike voice telephony. Consumers
require broadband connections capable of handling substantial data
volumes on an episodic, not continuous basis. The Internet's
asymmetrical nature refers to the fact that much of the broadband
connectivity that consumers require flows downstream from a content
source to a consumer. A narrowband, upstream request for content
can trigger a wideband download of the content bundled with an
additional payload of commercial advertising. Heretofore, Internet
traffic routing has not readily satisfied the Bellhead desire to
designate particular carriers and routes to meter usage for each and
every data session.
Faced with ever increasing bandwidth requirements, incumbent
carriers have resurrected a decidedly Bellhead notion that they
should implement technological innovations that can "sniff" and
meter Internet traffic,22 and thereby identify cost causers with greater
22. "A packet sniffer (also known as a network analyzer or protocol analyzer, for
particular types of networks, an Ethernet sniffer or wireless sniffer) is computer software
or computer hardware that can intercept and log traffic passing over a digital network or
part of a network. As data streams travel back and forth over the network, the sniffer
captures each packet and eventually decodes and analyzes its content according to the
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specificity. Innovations in packet prioritization may help incumbent
carriers achieve this objective, but such technologies have not yet
become commonly available. More fundamentally, competitive
necessity and preexisting operational and pricing strategies militate
against such metering. When they first introduced Internet services,
', 23
the incumbent carriers recognized that a predominant "Nethead
culture coupled with technological limitations foreclosed the simple
extension of voice telephony pricing, interconnection and cost
recovery techniques.
Recently, senior managers of incumbent carriers have signaled
their intent to meter and tier Internet services. AT&T Chairman Ed
Whitacre has colorfully expressed indignation that current standard
procedure for Internet pricing and interconnection has left his
company burdened with having to create, maintain and frequently
upgrade an expensive bit transport infrastructure while content firms,
such as Google, allegedly get a free ride:
Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain't
going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we
have to have a return on it. So there's going to have to be some
mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the
portion they're using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes?
The Internet can't be free in that sense, because we and the cable
companies have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo!
or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] free is
nuts! 24
In a Bellhead-managed, voice telephony environment, a
telephone company has the ability to meter a specific customer's
traffic and to bill for carrying that traffic on a metered or flat-rate.
With rare exception, a telephone company only handles traffic for
which it can expect to receive compensation from either the call
originator, or the call recipient. The Bellhead model for managing
traffic and recovering costs has a route-specific focus with
comprehensive tracking, usage metering and cost accounting.
Internet environment, carriers
In a Nethead-managed
interconnect their networks seamlessly and build cooperative
relationships designed to achieve global network connectivity. The

appropriate RFC or other specifications." Wikipedia, Packet sniffer, available at
http://en.eikipedia.org/wiki/Packetsniffer.
23. A Nethead has been defined as a "person who has a passion for the Internet, [or
one] involved with data networks and packet switching." PC MAGAZINE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
availableat http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/0,2542,t=Nethead&i=47793,00.asp.
24. At SBC, It's All About "Scale and Scope," BUSINESSWEEK, ONLINE EXTRA
November 7, 2005.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[29:171

Internet operates as a "network of networks"25 and offers users access
to content regardless of location. ISPs readily interconnect their
networks with an eye toward acquiring access to other carriers'
networks for payment, or in exchange for providing reciprocal access
on a zero payment basis. Accordingly, content generated by Google
and sought by an AT&T broadband service customer arrives at the
final destination via AT&T lines, but quite likely will have transited
the facilities of other ISPs upstream from AT&T. With the revenues
accruing from providing broadband access, AT&T either pays for
upstream access to other ISPs' networks, a transaction known as
transiting, or AT&T negotiates a reciprocal "peering" relation26 with
other ISPs whereby the parties voluntarily agree to exchange traffic,
often without funds transferring between the carriers. Google is no
more a free rider of AT&T networks than AT&T and its subscribers
would be when content originates on an AT&T network, but must
travel across the networks of other ISPs, with which AT&T has a
transiting27 or peering agreement, to reach a recipient who subscribes
to an ISP unaffiliated with AT&T.
The fact that incumbent carrier executives have gained traction
with the view that content providers enjoy a free ride underscores the
ability to obscure how Internet traffic traverses networks, and how
ISPs manage and pay for such networking. As well it may foreshadow
an aggressive campaign by carriers such as AT&T and Verizon to
change the fundamental terms and conditions under which consumers
access Internet content. Internet ventures have come up with many
different business models to recoup and profit from investments
including the offer of free, subsidized or deliberately under-priced

25. "The idea of a computer network intended to allow general communication
between users of various computers has developed through a large number of stages. The
melting pot of developments brought together the network of networks that we know as
the
Internet."
Wikipedia,
History
of
the
Internet,
available
at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History-of theInternet.
26. Internet peering refers a reciprocal traffic routing arrangement whereby one ISP
agrees to accept traffic for onward routing in exchange for a similar routing commitment
by another ISP. Peering typically involves no settlement or payment of funds as ISPs agree
to peer only if they generate and receive roughly the same volume of traffic. See also,
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peering.
27. Internet transiting refers to a traffic routing arrangement whereby one ISP agrees
to accept traffic for onward routing for compensation. Transiting involves a settlement and
payment of funds because one ISP requires access to the links, subscribers and content
available via another ISP's network and its peering arrangements. "Transit is the business
relationship whereby one ISP provides (usually sells) access to all destinations in its
routing table." William B. Norton, Internet Service Providers and Peering, Draft 2.5
(undated), available at http://www.equinix.com/pdf/whitepapers/PeeringWP.2.pdf.
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access to content. Internet ventures also may sweeten the deal by
increasing the value propositions of a service, i.e., providing more
options for free, or at a subsidized price. Keen on identifying and
charging cost causers, incumbent telecommunications companies may
want to alter and reduce the value proposition enjoyed by Internet
consumers, particularly ones who consume the most, e.g., gainers,
video file downloaders, and others who currently access the Internet
on an "all you can eat" ("AYCE") unmetered monthly subscription.
This article will examine Bellhead business models incorporating
metering and other traditional cost recovery strategies with an eye
toward determining what constitutes reasonable price discrimination
and what represents an unfair trade practice or an anticompetitive
strategy. The article will consider whether and how Bellhead
management strategies will jeopardize the serendipity and positive
networking externalities28 that have accrued when users can freely
"surf the web" and content providers can bundle user sought content
with advertising. Different pricing points based on throughput caps
makes sense to Bellhead corporate officers who think they can
capture rents that otherwise would accrue to content providers.
The article also will examine the clash of Bellhead and Nethead
cultures with an eye toward identifying the stakes involved when
Internet access pricing and interconnection primarily follows a
telecommunications infrastructure cost recovery scheme in lieu of
different commercial relationships favored by most Internet ventures.
The article concludes that most Bellhead cost recovery models are
lawful even though they will reduce for most consumers the real or
perceived value proposition offered by an unmetered monthly
Internet access subscription.
I.

Traditional Interconnection and Cost Recovery Models

To appreciate the significance of recent initiatives to change
Internet pricing, interconnection and quality of service conventions,
one
should
consider
the
traditional
models
used
by
telecommunications carriers and ISPs in telephony and the Internet

28. A positive network externality exists when the cost incurred by a user of the
Internet does not fully reflect the benefit derived with the addition of new users and points
of communications. See John Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,Compatibilityand
Innovation, 16 RAND J. OF ECON. 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz. & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). See also
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
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respectively. Bellhead and Nethead philosophies play a significant
role in shaping interconnection terms and conditions.

H. Telecommunications Settlements
Telecommunications carriers have established interconnection
and cost recovery models based on a network architecture designed

to provide a voice telephone circuit via a neutral conduit for the
content generated by others. In a nutshell, telecommunications

carriers closely track network usage, establish direct contractual
commitments with all carriers whose traffic traverses a network, and
expect compensation for each unit of traffic handled. For
international traffic, telecommunications carriers typically "match"
international half-circuits and financially "settle" accounts using a
fixed per minute accounting rate" that attributes a negotiated
financial value for each minute of traffic.
Ironically, the telephony model currently operates comparatively
on a less hierarchical and more democratic basis than the Internet
model. For example, each and every United States long distance
carrier seeking to provide directly routed telephone calling to any

foreign country generally can establish an operating agreement
directly with one or more foreign carriers. Until a few years ago,
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") policies required all
U.S. carriers, regardless of traffic volume, capitalization and global
presence, to comply with the same financial terms and conditions

when settling accounts with foreign carriers.' For domestic traffic
29. For background on the international accounting rate system, see Paul W.
Kenefick, A Step in the Right Direction: The FCC Provides Regulatory Relief in
International Settlements and International Services Licensing, 8 COMLCON43 (2000);
Robert M. Frieden, Boston Artech, 2001; MANAGING INTERNET-DRIVEN CHANGE IN
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ch. 9.1 (2001); Robert M. Frieden, Falling
Through the Cracks: International Accounting Rate Reform at the ITU and WTO, 22
TELECOM POL'Y, 963, 963-75 (1998) (describing how heightened attention to international
calling rates at the ITU and WTO has led some observers to conclude that carriers soon
will impose cost-based termination charges). Rob Frieden, Last Days of the Free Ride?
The Consequences of Settlement-Based Interconnectionfor the Internet, 1 INFO., No. 3, 225238 (June, 1999).
30. 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review Reform of the International Settlements Policy
and Associated Filing Requirements, IB Docket No. 98-148, Report and Order and Order
on Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd. 7963 (1999); Policy Statement on International
Accounting Rate Reform, 11 FCC Rcd. 3146, 3146 (1996) (stating intent to update
accounting rate policies to encourage competition and technological innovation);
International Settlement Rates, IB Docket No. 96-261, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
19806, 19891, 19894 (1997) (creating four transition periods for compliance with
benchmarks and responding to the potential for expanded opportunities for one-way
bypass of an accounting rate settlement created by the Basic Telecommunications Service
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carriers typically apply multi-element access charges for the use of

facilities to originate and terminate traffic." Some of the charges are
usage based and others are flat rated, where the cost does not vary
with usage.
In the Bellhead world, each and every carrier secures permission
to use another carrier's network for compensation on a highly
calibrated and typically

metered basis. A well-calibrated cost

recovery mechanism applies anytime and anywhere one carrier hands
off traffic to another carrier.32 Carrier "correspondents," of any size
Agreement); Regulation of International Accounting Rates, CC Docket No. 90-337, Phase
II,
Fourth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 20063, 20083, 20094 (1996) (permitting carriers
to negotiate alternatives to the traditional settlement rate system for routes where
effective competitive opportunities exist for U.S. carriers); 1998 Biennial Regulatory
Reviews Reform of International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing Requirements,
IB Docket No. 98-148, 13 FCC Rcd. 15320 (1998) (proposing largely to abandon
accounting rate scrutiny for traffic to World Trade Organization Member nations);
International Settlements Policy Reform; International Settlement Rates, IB Docket Nos.
02-324, 96-261, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 19954 (2002), First Report
and Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 5709 (2004).
31. Interstate access charges are imposed by local exchange carriers ("LECs") to
recover the costs of providing access to their networks for interstate and long-distance
service. The FCC seeks to promote the filing of access charges that recover costs from the
class of consumers that have caused the LEC to incur such costs. In particular, non-trafficsensitive costs-costs that do not vary with the amount of traffic carried over the facilities
should be recovered through flat-rate charges, and traffic-sensitive costs should be
recovered through per-minute charges. This approach fosters competition and efficient
pricing. The Part 69 rules of the FCC Rules and Regulations, 47 C.F.R. Pt. 69 (2005),
governing access charges, codifies this strategy. See Access Charge Reform, Price Cap
Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Transport Rate Structure and Pricing,
and End User Common Line Charges, First Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 15,982, paras.
344-48 (1997), affd, Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998);
Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers,
Low-Volume Long-Distance Users, Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Sixth
Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 12962 (2000); Developing a Unified Intercarrier
Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd. 9610 (2001).
32. "Existing intercarrier compensation rules may categorize as follows: access charge
rules, which govern the payments that interexchange carriers ("IXCs") and CMRS carriers
make to LECs to originate and terminate long-distance calls .... The access charge rules
can be further broken down into interstate acces charge rules that are set by this
Commission, and intrastate access charge rules that are set by state public utility
commissions. Both the interstate and intrastate access charge rules establish charges that
IXCs must pay to LECs when the LEC originates or terminates a call for an IXC, or
transports a call to, or from, the IXC's point of presence ("POP"). CMRS carriers also pay
access charges to LECs for CMRS-to-LEC traffic that is not considered local and hence
not covered by the reciprocal compensation rules. Other customers carrying traffic to or
from points within an excahnge area to points outside the exchange are may also pay
access charges to the LEC. These access charges may have different rate structures i.e.,
they may be flat-rated or traffic-sensitive. In general, where a long-distance call passes
through a LEC circuit switch, a per-minute charge is assessed. In order to keep local
telephone rates low, access charges have traditionallyl exceeded the forward-looking
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and traffic volume, secure direct interconnection of networks or
indirect transiting via the network of a third carrier. In the traditional
telecommunications model, carriers can readily track traffic routes
and meter traffic streams.33 With such specificity, carriers can easily
meter traffic and determine whether a carrier should receive payment
for switching, routing, and transporting more traffic than the carrier
handed off to another carrier.
HI.

ISP Peering and Transiting

In the Nethead world, ISPs typically use less calibrated measures
of traffic flow and also have a far greater number of cost recovery
options available for negotiation. ISPs traditionally have established
looser interconnection arrangements that may not even meter traffic
flows, and which emphasize the accessibility of bandwidth, number of
interconnection locations, diversity of available routes, and
availability of personnel. They can secure access to the entire, global
Internet cloud ' often by establishing a direct contractual arrangement
with a few ISPs who, in turn, have acquired other interconnection
arrangements with many other smaller ISPs.35
Initially, ISPs used a similarly democratic model during the early
days of the Internet. At that time, just about all ISPs agreed to peer
36
with any other ISP on a settlement free, "Sender Keep All
economic costs of providing access. Developiong a Unified Intercarrier Compensation
Regime, 16 FCC Rcd. 9610, 9611 (2001); Further of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd.
4685 (2005).
33. See International Telecommunication Union, ITU-T Recommendation D.140,
Charging and Accounting in International Telecommunication Services, Accounting Rate
Principles For International Telephone Services (July, 1998), available at
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/intset/itu-t/dl40/dl40_e_rev.html.
34. The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make
up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the
content available via these networks.
35. No single ISP can install and operate a ubiquitous global network capable of
reaching any and all sources of content and Internet access subscribers. Even the larger
ISPs that operate very high capacity, backbone must peer with other similarly large ISPs.
The smaller ISPs typically operate in a locality or region, but must provide the same global
Internet access. To achieve such access the smallest ISP pay larger ISPs for access to the
larger ISPs' customers, networks, and content available via the ISPs' networks as well as
the customers, networks, and content available via other ISP networks for which the ISPs'
have peering or transit arrangements. See also Wikipedia, Tier-1 network, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikifTier 1_ISP.
36. "In a bill-and-keep or sender-keeps-all arrangement, each carrier bills its own
customers for the origination of traffic and does not pay the other carrier for terminating
this traffic. In a settlement arrangement, on the other hand, the carrier on which the traffic
originates pays the other carrier to terminate the traffic. If traffic flow between the two
networks is balanced, the net settlement that each pays is zero, and therefore a bill-and-
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arrangement with no transfer of funds, or a transit

arrangement where one ISP pays to acquire access to another ISP's

network and its customers, as well as access to other ISPs' networks.
As government incubators and anchor tenants sought to privatize the
Internet, interconnection became less democratic and more

hierarchical. 38 Currently only the largest, Tier-1 ISPs agree to peering,
with smaller ISPs, having fewer customers, available routes,

bandwidth and interconnection points, having to pay to interconnect
and use the networks of the Tier-1 ISPs.
Even as smaller ISPs now have to pay for network access, the
Nethead credo of promoting global connectivity continues.

Theoretically a small ISP in the most remote location can provide its
customers access to just about any other ISP and any source or
recipient of content simply by securing a transit agreement with one
ISP higher up in the hierarchy. This ISP, located upstream from the
smaller ISP, typically can "advertise" routes, i.e., offer transit access
to other ISPs' networks, sufficient to secure global access to the
smaller ISP's subscribers.3 9 The brilliance in the Internet ISP
keep arrangement may be preferred because the networks do not have to incur costs to
measure and track traffic or to develop billing systems. As an example, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 allows for incumbent local exchange carriers to exchange
traffic with competitors using a bill-and-keep arrangement." Michael Kende, The Digital
Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 COMLCON45, n.60 (2003) (citing 47 U.S.C.
§252 (d)(2)(B)(i) (2000)). "The sharing of traffic over the interconnected networks
forming the Internet on a statistical and un-metered 'settlements' (or 'bill & keep') basis
was a hallmark of early federal agency involvement in the development of the Internet.
This system of traffic carriage free of charge became known as 'peering."' Barbara Esbin,
Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past 20 (F.C.C., O.P.P. Working
Paper No. 30, 1998), available at 1998 WL 567433.
37. For background on the economics and logistics of peering, see Geoff Huston,
Where's the Money?-Internet Interconnection and Financial Settlements (Jan. 2005),
availableat http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2005-01/; Steve Gibbard, Economics of Peering
(Oct.
2004),
available at http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/Gibbard-peeringeconomics.pdf; Daniel C.H. Mah, Explaining Internet Connectivity: Voluntary
InterconnectionAmong Commercial Internet Service Providers (March 26, 2003), available
at http://tprc.org/papers/2003/181/Explaining-Internet- Connectivity-Mar26-03.DOC.pdf;
William B. Norton, A Business Case for ISP Peering,Draft 1.3 (Feb. 19, 2002), availableat
http://www.equinix.com/pdf/whitepapers/Business-case.pdf; Jean-Jacques Laffont; Scott
Marcus; Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Interconnection and Access in Telecom and the
Internet, 91 AMER. ECON. REV., No. 2, 287-291 (May, 2001), Bill Woodcock, White Paper
on Transactions and Valuation Associated with Inter-CarrierRouting of Internet Protocol
Traffic,
or
BGP
for
Bankers,
(Aug.
2000),
available
at
http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/routing-economics/pch-routing-economics.htm.
38. See Rob Frieden, Does a Hierarchical Internet Necessitate Multilateral
Intervention? 26 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG., No. 2,361-405 (Spring, 2001).
39. Internet route advertisement refers to the network available to another ISP that
has secured peering or transit access. In other words Internet traffic management
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relationship lies in the positive networking externalities achieved
through global connectivity.
The specificity in routing and destinations in telecommunication
access arrangements largely eliminates any opportunity for free rides
or underpayment by a carrier. In Internet access arrangements, even
with the elimination of peering opportunities, some operators can
exploit transit and other routing agreements at least in the short run.
If an ISP does not bear much risk in providing qualitatively inferior
service it can exploit access to other ISPs' networks sooner and more
extensively. The concept of "hot potato routing"4 ° refers to an ISP's
decision to hand off traffic to another ISP closer to the service
territory of the handing-off ISP. Presumably, the quick hand off to
another operator reduces the handing off ISP's costs and makes fuller
use of transit opportunities.
Despite
significant
efforts
to
streamline
regulation,
telecommunications carriers' cost recovery strategies and tactics still
face significant government oversight. In contrast, ISPs typically
negotiate contracts subject to non-disclosure agreements, making it
quite difficult to determine the actual terms and conditions the parties
will use.42 Telecommunications settlements offer a generally
protocols provide a means for one ISP to know the available routing options available via
another ISP. See CISCO Documentation, Glossary, Advertising: "The router process in
which routing or service updates are sent at specified intervals so that other routers on the
network can maintain lists of usable routes." Cisco Documentation Glossary, available at
http://www.cisco.com/univred/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ita/a12.htm.
40. "Rather than lease lines throughout the nation and expand capacity, the free
rider ISP may attempt to hand off traffic to a larger, better equipped ISP at the closest
public peering point. The free rider ISP considers traffic a 'hot potato' and has a financial
incentive to pass such traffic off to any other ISP who agrees to take it." Robert Frieden,
Without Public Peer: the Potential Regulatory and Universal Service Consequences of
Internet Balkanization,3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, P 2 n.2 (1998); see also Michael Kende, The
DigitalHandshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 COMLCON45, 60 (2003).
41. See Renata Teixeira Aman Shaikh Tim Griffin and Jennifer Rexford, Dynamics
of
HotPotato
Routing
in
IP
Networks
(undated),
available
at
http://rp.lip6.fr/-teixeira/pl84-teixeira.pdf.
42. In the United States and most nations ISPs avoid traditional telecommunications
service regulations. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over
Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4823 (2002) (deeming cable modem
broadband Internet access an information service), affirmed in partand vacated in part sub
nom., Brand X Internet Services v. F.C.C., 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), reversed and
remanded sub nom., Nat'l Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Services, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005), on remand, 435 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. Jan 23, 2006);
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20
FCC Rcd. 14853, 14856 (2005) (reclassifying Digital Subscribers Link Internet access from
a telecommunications service to an information service). Because the FCC has only a
limited legal basis to regulate Information Services Providers under Title I of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. the Commission cannot
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transparent process among equals with money flowing from one
carrier to the other based almost exclusively on traffic flows. Few
ISPs now peer on a zero cost basis and the flow of funds depends on a

number
of factors in addition to traffic flows, including location of the
43
ISp.

While ISPs do not ignore the cost of doing business, they pursue
a cooperative routing arrangement often based on a less-than-

scientific "rough justice" estimate of whether a carrier offers
switching, routing and bit transport services equivalent to what it
receives. ISPs in remote areas,' including most developing countries,
bear the entire financial burden to access larger ISP networks, often

via expensive international satellite links. In a worst case scenario,
require ISPs to file public tariffs specifying the term and conditions of service. Likewise
the FCC cannot require ISPs to disclose the terms and conditions under which they
interconnect lines through peering and transiting.
43. "Tier 1 networks typically seek to protect their relatively rare status by
preventing new networks from becoming Tier l's and thus potentially competing. The
networks often accomplish this by setting "peering requirements" which are intended to
be too high for new networks to meet. Some experts in the field of Internet
interconnections have compared the collective behaviors and motivations of Tier 1
networks to those of a cartel, in that they attempt to restrict the admission of new
members. When one Tier 1 is perceived to be "cheating" the cartel by selling transit for
too low a price, or by "dumping" too much outbound heavy bandwidth (which is
significantly easier to deliver for the sending network than the receiving network), other
members may move to de-peer that network." Wikipedia, Tier 1 network, Politics,
availableat http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier 1_carrier.
44. "In the past it has been claimed that the most common charging arrangements for
international Internet connection disadvantage smaller networks and developing countries
generally, and disadvantage Australian industry specifically. Previous lobbying by industry
has led to action internationally by the Department of Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts (DCITA).
In particular peering and transit practices were singled out for complaint:
The largest international ISPs ("Tier is") operate peering arrangements for
exchanging Internet traffic among themselves without charge.
Under transit arrangements, non-Tier 1 and remoted networks are required to
cover all costs of international data transport, in both directions, to points of
interconnection with Tier 1 networks. Smaller networks also pay interconnection
charges ('port charges'). Under the transit model, charging relates only to the
relative size of the networks and takes no account of the exchange of value
between networks. This arrangement is said to advantage the Tier-1 market
operators, while disadvantaging smaller networks and developing countries,
available
at
http://www.dcita.gov.au/communications for business/international/traderelate
d-issues/international-communicationscosts.
45. See Global Internet Policy Initiative, Internet Exchange Points: Their Importance
to Development of the Internet and Strategies for their Deployment - The African
Example
(June
6,
2002,
revised
May
3,
2004),
available
at
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an ISP in a developing country lacks access to a local or regional

facility for the exchange of traffic thereby requiring transit via distant
ISP facilities even for the delivery of local traffic. Having to selfprovide telecommunications line access to other ISPs, and the
possibility of "tromboning, ''46 via distant ISP facilities even for local

traffic, juxtaposes with the greater uniformity and equality in
telecommunications cost sharing.47
One key way to reduce Internet traffic costs lies in the
installation of local or regional facilities that link many ISPs and their

separate networks. Such Internet Exchange Points ("IXPs")

4s

make it

possible for each participating ISP to better exploit the Internet's
"network of networks" synergy, i.e., the opportunity for an ISP to

hand off traffic for carriage by other ISPs instead of having to

http://www.internetpolicy.net/practices/ixp.pdf;
Russell
Southwood,
International
Telecommunication Union, Via Africa Creating local and regional IXPs to save money
and bandwidth, Discussion Paper Prepared for IDRC and ITU for the 2004 Global
Symposium
for
Regulators,
available
at
http://www.itu.int/ITUD/treg/publications/AfricalXPRep.pdf; Timothy Denton, Jim Savage and Rob Frieden,
International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services, study prepared for the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation Group, Telecommunications Committee (1999-2000)
availableat http://www.tmdenton.com/pub/reports/index.htm.
46. "In some cases, where there is no local or regional facility for the exchange of
Internet traffic, developing country ISPs must pay for international transit facilities to
deliver local traffic. This practice is know as "tromboning." InfoDev and the International
Telecommunication Union, ict regulation toolkit, 4.8.1 The Role of Internet Exchange
Points
(undated),
available at
http://icttoolkit.infodev.org/en/Section.2192.html
[hereinafter cited as ICT Regulation Toolkit].
47. "Without an IXP, ISPs have to pay international bandwidth prices for traffic that
is actually destined locally within a particular country. In most cases the traffic travel
overseas through two satellite hops before it reaches its destination a few kilometers
across a city. With an IXP present within a country, each ISP pays HALF the cost to reach
each of the other ISPs, since they all meet at a neutral point in the middle." African
Internet Service Providers Association, "The Halfway Proposition"Background Paper on
reverse subsidy of G8 countries by African ISPs, p. 4, presented at the Conference of
African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Johannesburg, South
Africa (Oct. 19, 2002), available at http://afrispa.skybuilders.com/.
48. Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) in developing countries are important for a
number of reasons. They:
Enable efficient, cost effective management of Internet traffic,
Provide an interface between multiple ISPs. This enables ISPs to avoid
tromboning local and regional traffic,
Should help stimulate market entry by new ISPs, web hosting and equipment colocation developers, and content creators. ICT Regulation Toolkit, 4.8.2
Supporting
IXPs
in
Developing
Countries,
available
at
http://icttoolkit.infodev.org/en/Section.2194.html.

2007]

NETWORK NEUTRALITY OR BIAS?

engineer a longer, possibly circuitous route. 9 ISPs interconnect
networks at IXPs, because individually and collectively they can
reduce their bandwidth and line transmission costs, operate more
efficiently and provide more reliable service with reduced instances of
service delay (latency).
IXPs provide a centralized hub and spoke network typology
instead of requiring each ISP, regardless of size, traffic volume and
capitalization, to erect a mesh network covering the globei ° Because
the Internet offers access to content and users anywhere, each ISP has
to secure network connections to all potential recipients of content
and senders of content, or competitively suffer for the lack of global
reach. Reciprocal interconnection-whether freely provisioned or
provided for a fee-makes it possible for an ISP to access the entire
global Internet cloud for its subscribers and thereby to accrue
increasing value from the Internet, because its utility and value
increase with the number of accessible points of communications. 1
ISPs operating without the benefit of a local or even regional
IXP bear the financial burden of having to secure links with the
largest and most desirable Tier-1 ISP networks at a location at their
own expense possibly thousands of miles distant, on terms primarily
established by the larger ISP. Remotely located ISPs, and ones with
comparatively fewer subscribers, networking options, and content
options must procure expensive telecommunications links, including
one or more satellite hops, or a long submarine cable link to route
traffic to and from an ISP leasing transit access to networks and
content throughout the world. ISPs do not split operating costs in
half, like the telecommunications half-circuit. Accordingly, smaller
and remotely located ISPs must pay for the complete
telecommunications links to ISPs willing to provide transit access to
the Internet cloud 2
49. "IXPs provide a centralized hub and spoke network typology. These enable ISPs
to hand off traffic directly to other nearby ISPs, and to aggregate long haul access. IXPs
offer traffic switching and routing flexibility. By using an IXP, ISPs can individually and
collectively reduce their bandwidth and line transmission costs, provide more reliable
service with lower latency, and operate more efficiently." ICT Regulation Toolkit, 4.8.1
The
Role
of
Internet
Exchange
Points,
available
at
http://icttoolkit.infodev.org/en/Section.2192.html.
50. See
ICT
Regulation
Toolkit,
4.8.1,
Figure
2,
available at
http://icttoolkit.infodev.org/en/Section.2192.html.
51. Supra note 28.
52. For an assessment of self provisioning financial impact on Australian ISPs see
John Hibbard, John de Ridder, Dr. George R. Barker and Professor Robert Frieden,
International Internet Connectivity and its Impact on Australia, Final Report on an

Investigation for the Department of Communication Information Technology and the Arts,
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Practically speaking, even the largest ISPs need to rely on the
network reach and customer accessibility provided by other ISPs. But
unlike the large Tier-1 ISPs who agree to handle the traffic of other
similarly situated ISPs on a zero cost basis, small and remotely
located ISPs become clients and resellers of the network services
provided by large ISPs. This may appear unfair in light of
"democratic" telecommunications line cost sharing arrangements, but
the Internet operates largely free of rate regulation and other forms
of government oversight. Tier-1 ISPs typically can require smaller
carriers to pay for network access, but on the other hand the smaller
ISPs do have a number of Tier-1 ISP network options. With payment
for access, smaller ISPs not only have access to a Tier-1 ISP's
subscribers, but also the content those subscribers make available and
the network access the Tier-1 ISP itself has secured from other ISPs
located throughout the world.
Some would argue that market-based Internet access achieves an
efficient outcome while creating incentives for ISPs to continue
building out and expanding networks. But on the other hand a
disproportionate financial burden foisted on the poorest ISPs and
their subscribers has the potential to exacerbate the "digital divide"
with easy and robust ICE access opportunities
which separates people
53
and those without.
IV. Current Marketplace Conditions Affecting Peering/Transit

Decision-making
The process by which an ISP qualifies for free peering, as opposed
to having to pay for peering or transit services, remains largely private.
ISPs negotiate terms and conditions, and few offer public disclosure of
the criteria used to qualify for peering. Likewise, the final negotiated
agreement falls under comprehensive nondisclosure agreements
making a forensic examination quite difficult.
However, several Tier-2 ISPs have posted on their websites
general qualifications for its agreement to peer." Having now merged
at
available
(2004),
Australia
Canberra,
http://www.dcita.gov.au/-data/assets/word-doc/16616/IIC-report- -web-version.doc
53. See, e.g., Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Regulatory
Reform as a Tool for Bridging the Digital Divide (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/11/34487084.pdf.
54. See, e.g., MCI, MAE Peering, How to Connect to the MAE Network, available at
http://www.mae.net/peer/howToConnect.htm;
available at
Peering
Information,
SBC
Internet
Services
SBC
Corp.,
http://www.sbcbackbone.net/peering/; Club Internet, T-Online France Public Peering
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with AT&T, BellSouth, Pacific Telosis, Ameritech and others, SBL
now operates as a major Tier ISP. The merged AT&T requires
peering candidates to meet rigorous qualifications, peering
requirements offer the best available snapshot of the typical
prerequisites for securing domestic U.S. peering agreements. AT&T
requires the following of peering candidates:
1. Peer must operate a U.S.-wide IP backbone whose links are
primarily OC192 or greater in size.
2. Peer must meet AS7018 at a minimum of five mutually
agreeable geographically diverse points. The U.S. interconnection
points must be chosen from the following list of cities, and must
include at least one city on the U.S. east coast and one on the U.S.
west coast: New York City, Washington D.C./Ashburn, VA,
Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Seattle, San Francisco/San Jose and Los
Angeles. In addition one peering point must be in a European
country and another in an Asian-Pacific country. Peering outside
the U.S. will be with AT&T's regional AS only.
3. Traffic traveling over the U.S. interconnection links to/from
AS7018 must be on-net only and must amount to at least 1 Gbps
peak in total.
4. Interconnection bandwidth must be at least OC12 at each U.S.
interconnection point.
5. A customer of any of AT&T's dedicated IP services on
AS7018 may not simultaneously be a peer of AS7018.
6. Peer must have a professionally managed 24x7 NOC. Peer must
agree to fix any problems within a reasonable timeframe. Peer
must also agree to actively cooperate to resolve security incidents,
denial of service attacks and other operational problems.
7. Peer must maintain a balanced traffic ratio between its
network and AS7018. In particular:
a. No more than 2.0:1.0 ratio of traffic flowing in either
direction, on average.

Information and Private Network Interconnection Guidelines, available at
http://www.club-internet.fr/Peering/; New Zealand Internet Exchanges, Terms and
Conditions for ExchangeNET Customers, available at http://nzix.net/terms.html; Vienna
University
Computer Center,
Internet
Peering
Agreement,
available at
http://www.vix.at/vix-aconet-pa.doc; U-Net Peering Policy, available at http://www.unet.net/about/peering.htm; IP Exchange, Internet Peering Agreement available at
http://peering.ip-exchange.de/peering-agreement-ipx-english.pdf; Equinex, How to Peer
with Equinix, availableat https://ecc.equinix.com/peering/how.htm.
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b. Balanced time of day traffic distribution currently as
measured by peak to average traffic levels.
8. Peer must abide by the following routing policy:
a. Peer must use the same peering AS at each U.S.
interconnection point, and must advertise a consistent set
of routes at each point.
b. No transit or third-party routes are to be announced; all
routes exchanged must be customer routes.
c. We expect that peers will filter route announcements
from their customers by prefix.
d. Neither party shall abuse the peering relationship by
any of the non-exhaustive list of actions following, such as:
pointing a default route at the other or otherwise
forwarding traffic for destinations not explicitly advertised,
resettling next=hop, selling or giving next-hop to others.
9. Existing peers of AS7018 will have their peering status
reviewed periodically to ensure joint capacity planning and to
ensure that all criteria continue to be met. AT&T reserves the
right to terminate peering, upon notice period as determined by
the parties' agreement, with peers who do not meet the criteria
described above. Maintaining a peering relationship with AT&T
is also contingent upon the potential or existing peers continued
financial stability. Periodic review of the policies above will be
conducted to ensure that the criteria and eligibility requirements
are consistent with AT&T growth and expansion.
10. For current and potential peers having substantial portions of
their network outside the U.S., AT&T may elect to evaluate the
conditions for peering with that peer under the policies
governing its European, Latin American, Canadian or AsiaPacific IP ASNs, as set forth above.55
11. Consistent routes announcements at all public peering points.
55. AT&T Global IP Network Settlement-Free Peering Policy, available at
http://www.corp.att.com/peering/. As part of concessions made to secure FCC approval of
its merger with BellSouth, AT&T has made commitments to the same number of peering
agreements as existed on the date of merger closing for a period of three years. See Letter
from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., AT&T Services, Inc. Federal Regulatory ro Ms. Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Ex Parte
Communication in the Matter of Review of AT&T and BellSouth Corp Application for
Consent to Transfer of Control, WC Docket No. 06-74 (Dec. 28, 2006) attached to Federal
Communications Commission, News Release, FCC Approves Merger of AT&T Inc. and
BellSouth Corporation, Significant Public Interest Benefits Likely to Result (rel. Dec. 29,
2006), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-269275Al.pdf

[hereinafter cited as AT&T BellSouth Merger Approval].
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V. Traditional End User Payment Models
Telephone companies traditionally have charged customers for
long distance services on a usage sensitive basis, i.e., minutes of use,
but have offered most wireline local service options on an umetered
basis. Before regulatory policies have favored averaging and
"integrating ' 56 the costs of long distance particularly to blunt the
higher cost of serving Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and rural locales telephone companies. 7 Most telephone
subscribers continue to pay for long distance telephone service on a
per minute basis, at fixed, "postalized" rates regardless of distance,
much like fixed postal rates for letters whether sent across town or
across the nation. 8
Recently telephone companies have offered unmetered AYCE
long distance calling subscriptions primarily in response to such
options available from VoIP ventures and the fact that many mobile
telephone carriers offer customers the option of using available
minutes for "free" long distance calling. In addition to competitive
necessity, significant reductions in interconnection charges make it

56. See Integration of Rates and Services for the Provision of Communications by
Authorized Common Carriers between the Contiguous States and Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands, Final Recommended Decision, 9 FCC Rcd. 2197, 2198 n.2
(1993) ("'Rate integration' is the Commission policy that was adopted to describe service
between the contiguous states and Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
(noncontiguous points) at rates that are equivalent to those prevailing for comparable
distances in the contiguous 48 states.").
57. Section 254(g) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 254(g)(2005)
codified prior FCC rate averaging policy: "Within 6 months after February 8, 1996, the
Commission shall adopt rules to require that the rates charged by providers of
interexchange telecommunications services to subscribers in rural and high cost areas shall
be no higher than the rates charged by each such provider to its subscribers in urban areas.
Such rules shall also require that a provider of interstate interexchange
telecommunications services shall provide such services to its subscribers in each State at
rates no higher than the rates charged to its subscribers in any other State."
58. Implicit subsidies in telecommunications "result, in large part from rate averaging
between rural and suburban/urban areas and the recovery of certain non-traffic sensitive
costs through traffic sensitive per minute rates, which over-recovers costs from higher
volume users, often business customers." Review of the Section 251 Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket No. 01-338, 2003 WL
22175730, at *17078 n.509 (F.C.C. Aug. 21, 2003); see generally Access Charge Reform,
Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Low-Volume Long Distance
Users, Federal-State Joint Board On Universal Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,962, 12,971-72
(2002) (CALLS Order) (describing how high-volume users bear a greater share of the
non-traffic sensitive costs than low-volume users), affd in part, rev'd in part,and remanded
in part sub nom. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 265
F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2001).
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possible for carriers to offer unlimited local and long distance calling
options.
ISPs historically have offered customers AYCE service. ISPs first
provided Internet access using local business lines that themselves
may not have been metered by local exchange carriers. Additionally,
it appears that customers expected Internet access to match the
available unmetered local calling options, notwithstanding the fact
that the local call usually interconnected with a long haul routing to
reach distant sources of Internet content.
Most ISPs initially offered a "one size fits all" dial-up access. As
broadband access options became available via Digital Subscriber
Links59 and cable modems, customers could generally expect to
receive ISP's differentiated service based on the throughput. ISPs
now offer services analogous to an airline's first class, business class,
and economy seating based on the bit rate speed for downloading and
uploading content. Few observers would consider providing different
bit rates and service price points unreasonable discrimination as
opposed to reasonable product differentiation.
VI. Reshaping the Internet Using the Bellhead Model
Incumbent telecommunications carriers in the United States,
such as AT&T, Verizon, and Qwest, own and operate many of the
major Tier-1 ISPs that have a significant market share.60 In the
European Union and other nations, companies that formerly enjoyed
a monopoly, such as NTT Corporation, British Telecom, Deutsche
Telekom, and Singtel, also have a dominant market share. The
merger activities of telecommunications carriers includes the
acquisition of major Internet infrastructure operators, including
networks previously operated independently by MCI, AT&T, GTE,
BBN, Worldcom, MFS Communications, UUNet, Savvis and Verio.

59. Bell Atlantic, now known as Verizon, described its digital subscriber line service
as "an interstate data special access service that provides a high speed access connection
between an end user subscriber and an Internet Service Provider (ISP) by utilizing a
combination of the subscriber's existing local exchange physical plant (i.e. copper facility),
a specialized DSL-equipped wire center, and transport to the Asynchronous Transfer
Mode Cell Relay Service where the ISP will connect to Bell Atlantic's network." Bell
Atlantic Telephone Companies, CC Docket No. 98-168, Tariff No. 1, Transmittal No.
1081, Order, DA 98-1988, 13 FCC Rcd. 18911 (1998).
60. One credible list of the Tier-1 ISPs includes: AOL-Time Warner, AT&T, Global
Crossing, Level 3, Verizon Business, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, Qwest, Savvis and
Sprint Nextel Corporation. Wikipedia, List of Tier 1 ISPs, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_carrier.
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The senior managers of incumbent telecommunications carriers
have the ability and apparently now the interest to manage the
Internet. This ability lies in the carriers' market share and ownership
of major Tier-1 ISPs. 61 The interest largely stems from the need to
establish new profit centers as traditional telephony becomes less
profitable and incumbent carrier market shares decline. Incumbent
carriers have made sizeable investments in network upgrades to
provide broadband services and to target customers with "triple-play"
or "quadruple-play" bundles of wireline and wireless telephony,
video programming, and Internet access.
Having seen the massive rise in capitalization accrued by some
Internet content and service providers, such as Google, incumbent
carriers also want upward trajectory in their stock price and revenue
streams. Some of the major broadband network operators believe the
best way to achieve this goal involves partitioning network bandwidth
and prioritizing bitstreams by offering different quality of service
guarantees. 62 To some observers this strategy constitutes a form of
service discrimination that violates a longstanding tradition of
network neutrality in the switching, routing, and transmission of
Internet traffic. 63 Since its inception the Internet has operated as a
seamlessly interconnected collection of networks whose operators
typically agree to handle the traffic of other operators on a "best
efforts" basis.' Opponents of compulsory neutrality claim that they
61. Frieden, supra note 20 at 125-144.
62. "The network builders are spending a fortune constructing and maintaining the
networks that Google intends to ride on with nothing but cheap servers," Arshad
Mohammed, Verizon Executive Calls for End to Google's 'Free Lunch,' Washington Post,
page D1 (February 7, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/2/06/AR2006020601624.html; Craig McTaggart, Was the Internet
Ever Neutral?, paper presented at the 34th Telecommunications Policy Research
at
Sept.
30,
2006,
available
Arlington,
Va.
Conference,
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/593/mctaggart-tprcO6rev.pdf.
63.

Tim Wu, Why You Should Care About Network Neutrality The future of the

Internet depends on it! Slate, May 1, 2006, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2140850;
John Windhausen, Jr., Good Fences Make Bad Broadband Preserving an Open Internet
through Net Neutrality, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 6, 2006), available at

http://www.publicknowledge.org/content/papers/pk-net-neutrality-whitep-20060206;
Barbara Van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality
Regulations, 5 J.ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L, (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=812991.
64. "The Internet is a vast network of individual computers and computer networks
that communicate with each other using the same communications language, Transmission
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). The Internet consists of approximately more
than 100 million computers around the world using TCP/IP protocols. Along with the
development of TCP/IP, the open network architecture of the Internet has the following
characteristics or parameters: 1. Each distinct network stands on its own with its own
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that their

interconnection arrangements result from commercial necessity, and
have achieved ample connectivity with plenty of routing options
available to all operators. The option of offering a "better than best

efforts" level of service provides a means for consumers and carriers
to secure and pay for premium service, if so desired.
Replacing best efforts with variable quality of service ("QOS")
offers and AYCE Internet access with metered service imposes

traditional telephony interconnection, cost recovery, and consumer
marketing strategies. The value proposition currently enjoyed by
consumers will change and may decline should incumbent carriers
succeed in migrating users to pricing arrangements and service plans

that incorporate these strategies. Advocates for pricing,
interconnection and QOS flexibility characterize the initiative as
lawful price discrimination that can offer consumers greater flexibility
and possibly lower bills for low volume users. 66 Net neutrality
specific environment and user requirements, notwithstanding the use of TCP/IP to connect
to other parts of the Internet. Communications are not directed in a unilateral fashion.
Rather, communications are routed throughout the Internet on a best efforts basis in
which some packets of information may go through one series of computer networks and
other packets of information -go through a different permutation or combination of
computer networks, with all of these information packets eventually arriving at their
intended destination. 2. Black boxes, for lack of a better term, connect the various
networks; these boxes are called 'gateways' and 'routers.' The gateways and routers do not
retain information but merely provide access and flow for the packets being transmitted. 3.
There is no global control of the Internet." Konrad L. Trope, Voice Over Internet
Protocol: The Revolution in America's Telecommunications Infrastructure, 22 CoMP. &
INTERNET L. 1. No. 12, 1, 4 (Dec. 2005).
65. Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
requires common carriers to offer rate regulated, cost-based service to the public on a
nondiscriminatory basis. "Common carrier legislation and regulation were initially
intended to cover wired telecommunications services. Telephone and telegraph
communications were perceived as a 'natural monopoly' early in the twentieth century.
Because of the prohibitive cost of building a wired telephone or telegraph network
combined with the desire to provide 'universal service' to consumers, the government's
original legislative and regulatory approach was to foster and protect AT&T's monopoly
in telephone wires, switches, and services." Jessica Finley, Anticipating Regulation of New
Telecommunications Technologies: An Argument for the European Model, 26 Nw. J.INT'L.
L. & BuS 447,450 (Winter, 2006).
66. See, e.g., Kyle dixon et al, A Skeptic's Primer on Net Neutrality Regulation, The
Progress and Freedom Foundation, Progress on Point, Release 13.14 (June, 2006),
available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/popl3.14primernetneut.pdf; Testimony of
Mr. David L. Cohen, Executive Vice President, Comcas Corporation, United States
Senate
Judiciary
Committee,
June
14,
2006,
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1937&witid=5417; Testimony of Gregory
Sidak, Visiting Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center, Senate Committee
of Commerce, Science and Transportation, Hearing on "Network Neutrality," (Feb. 7,
2006), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/sidak-020706.pdf; Testimony of Kyle D.
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advocates see the initiative as an attempt to legitimize network bias,

bit discrimination, and fragmentation of the Internet into different
service levels and brands.67 The rhetoric and volume of the debate has

generated much confusion with no movement to a consensus. 8 No
compromise codified into law. 69

Regardless of the private and commercial nature of the currently
constituted Internet, advocates for network neutrality emphasize the
positive networking effects of a collective and unbalkanized system. If
major ISPs can freely block and degrade specific traffic streams, net
neutrality advocates warn of societal losses as the Internet becomes a
more expensive and less serendipitous experience. Net bias advocates
scoff at such global pronouncements and offer their view that
combining plain vanilla routing with superior service offers options
no different than the multiple classes of service provided by most
airlines, or the qualitative difference between free and toll highways.

Dixon, Senior Fellow for Regulatory Law and Economics, The Progress and Freedom
Foundation, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Hearing on
"Network Neutrality," (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/dixon020706.pdf.
67. See, e.g., Testimony of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet
Evangelist, Google, Inc., United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, Hearing on "Network Neutrality," (Feb. 7, 2006), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf; Nicholas Economides, Economics of the
Internet, NET Institute, Working Paper No. 07-01 (Jan. 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=954446.
68. Some network neutrality analysts have sough to forge a middle ground consensus.
See Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the Quest
for a Balanced Policy, paper presented at the 34th Telecommunications Policy research
at
2006),
available
30,
Va,
(Sep.
Arlington,
Conference,
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/574/Peha balanced-net neutralitypolicy.pdf;
Robert D. Atkinson and Philip J. Weiser, A "Third Way" on Network Neutrality, The
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (May 30, 2006), available at
http://www.itif.org/files/netneutrality,pdf; Paul Ganley and Ben Allgrove, Net Neutrality:A
available at
User's Guide, 22 COMP. L & SOC., No. 6 (2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=925693; Daniel J. Weitzner, The
Neutral Internet: An Information Architecturefor Open Societies (June 20, 2006), available
at http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2006/06/neutralnet.html.
69. Both the United States Senate and House of Representatives have considered
network neutrality bills without enacting any into law. Wallace Koehler, Network
at
available
1,
2006),
(May
Under
Challenge
Neutrality
http://www.infotoday.com/newsbreaks/nb060501-1.shtml; Anne Broache, Net neutrality
field in Congress gets crowded, cnetnews.com (May 19, 2006), available at
http://news.com.com/Net+neutrality+field+in+Congress+gets+crowded/2100-1028_3at
available
cnetnews.com,
neutrality
showdown,
Net
6074564.html;
http://news.com.com/Net+neutrality+showdown/2009-1028_3-605513 3 .html.
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VII. What Is Network Neutrality?
Advocates for network neutrality in the United States and
elsewhere 0 have called upon NRAs and legislatures to ensure that
ISPs cannot discriminate against, or favor specific bitstreams. They
believe this network neutrality principle should apply both upstream
to other ISPs, or downstream to other ISPs and, in turn, the treatment
of end users. Net neutrality advocates believe that the Internet has
contributed to national productivity, economic opportunity, and
innovation in light of its nondiscriminatory, end-to-end connectivity.
Many net neutrality advocates speak and write in apocalyptic
terms that allowing price and service discrimination will eviscerate
the Internet and enable carriers to delay or shut out competitors and
ventures unwilling or unable to pay surcharges. The head of a
consumer group claims that incumbent telephone and cable
companies can reshape the nation's digital destiny by branding the
Internet and foreclosing much of its societal and cultural benefits.7"
Net bias advocates, emphasize that ISPs should have unfettered
pricing freedom which has promoted innovation, risk tasking, and
diverse services and features.7 2
Few advocates for net neutrality have articulated what, if any,
pricing, interconnection, and QOS discrimination they believe can
occur without defeating the goal of neutrality. Two academic analysts,
generally in favor of network neutrality, or at least no major
impediments to end-to-end connectivity, have offered two
concessions to carrier operational flexibility. Professor Lawrence
Lessig differentiates between ISP pricing strategies that auction off
lanes of broadband service by tiering access between content sources
and users, and ISPs who offer end users different throughput speeds

70. See, e.g., Viktoria Kocsis and Paul W.J. de Bijl, Network neutrality and the nature
of
competition
between
network
operators (Sept.
2006),
available
at
http://www.tilburguniversity.nlltilec/[ublications/report/dget.pdf;
Yoshihiro
Katagiri,
Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japanese Policy on Network
Neutrality,
available
at

http://www.soumu.go.jp/joho-tsusin/eng/presentation/pdflO61212l.pd
71. See Jeff Chester, The End of the Internet?, THE NATION (posted Feb. 1, 2006),
availableat www.thenation.com/doc/20060213/chester.
72. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Neutering the net, FINANCIAL TIMES, FT.com

Online, (posted March 20, 2006), available at http:/lnews.ft.comlcms/s/392ad708-b837llda-bfc5-0000779e2340.html; Testimony of J. Gregory Sidak, United States Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (Feb. 7, 2006), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdflsidak-020706.pdf.
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or permissible volume of traffic.73 Access-tiering violates Professor
Lessig's sense of network neutrality because it would weaken
competition for Internet services and the potential for continuing
growth by erecting additional financial barriers to entry by innovators
unable to pay the surcharges demanded by major network operators.
Professor Lessig considers consumer-tiering a permissible strategy by
network operators to recoup infrastructure investments and to create
necessary incentives for more investment even though it probably
would result in changing the consumer value proposition by helping
network operators extract higher revenues particularly from large
volume "power" users.
Professor Ed Felten distills network discrimination in terms of
whether an ISP drops packets of a content provider based on
operational necessity or deliberate degradation of service.74 Minimal
dropping of packets normally occurs in peering and transiting when
an ISP's best efforts cannot accommodate the current volume of
traffic. Absent a strategy to prioritize packets, the set protocols75 and
the contracts executed between ISPs call for "first come, first served"
processing. Non-minimal dropping of packets would occur when an
ISP prioritizes packets in such ways as to trigger delays and lost
packets even in the absence of congestion.
In Professor Felten's dichotomy of packet dropping, network
bias occurs when an ISP partitions its networks in such a way as to all
but guarantee that non-priority bitstreams experience lost packets
and degradation of service quality even when it is possible for the ISP
to avoid dropping any packets. When packet dropping occurs even
during uncongested conditions an ISP engages in anticompetitive
discrimination because the ISP deliberately degrades service, not to
accommodate a priority customer but to punish a low paying one.
Permissible net bias occurs when an ISP carves out a portion of its
network to create a virtual, stand alone network. This off network
design provides something akin to an intranet, i.e., a partitioned
network available to single corporate client or group of customers.

73. Lawrence Lessig, Prepared Testimony Before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, Hearing on "Network Neutrality" (Feb 7, 2006),
availableat http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-020706.pdf.
74. Professor Edward Felten, Freedom to Tinker Blog, Nuts and Bolts of Net
Discrimination, (March 2, 2006), availableat http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=983
Nuts and Bolts of Net Discrimination, Part 2 (March 7, 2006), available at
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=986.
75. See
Wikipedia,
Internet
protocol
suite,
available
at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet-protocolsuite.
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However, the intranet may be virtual in nature and designed
primarily to guarantee two dichotomous routing experiences based on
price: near certain real time delivery of packets without loss and near

certain packet dropping.
VIII. The FCC's Four Network Freedoms

Over several years, the FCC has aggressively sought to free
carriers providing Internet access of any significant regulatory
responsibilities that apply to telecommunications service providers.
The Internet has flourished in part due to a "hands off" approach by
governments and the willingness of network operators to make
increasing investments in the infrastructure needed to transport the
bits that correspond to commercially successful content and services.
As the Internet becomes a conduit for most converged services, the
ventures operating bit transmission networks must make additional,
substantial investments to handle growing Internet traffic along with
new traffic streams that include full motion video.
At the vigorous urging of incumbent carriers, the FCC has
perceived the need to create more incentives for carriers to make
broadband investments. The Commission has largely dismantled
compulsory access requirements and the use of mandatory pricing
model that forces incumbent carriers to offer network elements76 at
76. "Local loop unbundling (LLU) is a potentially important option that could allow
competitors to use unbundled elements or unbundled services of... [the incumbent's]
access network to provide alternative telephone or broadband access services to end-users.
Most OECD countries require unbundling, including the US, Canada, UK and Australia.
Unbundling can create incentives for new investment in broadband access and drive faster
deployment of broadband services because it allows less costly access to consumers for
alternative broadband service providers. Vigorous competition can be expected to drive
prices down towards cost." New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, (May 5,
2004), Report on commerce commission's local loop and fixed PDN unbundling
investigation, File BTP/1/TCOMP/1 1, available at http://www.med.govt.nz/pbt/telecomlluinvestigation/ministry-report/ministry-report.pdf; See also, Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11
FCC Rcd. 15499, 10 (1996), affid in part and rev'd in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); on remand, Iowa Utils. Bd., v. FCC. 219 F.3d 744 (8' Cir. 2000);
affirmed in part and rev'd in part, Verizon Comms., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002); see
also, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696, 16 FCC Rcd. 1724 (1999); reversed and
remanded, United States Telecom. Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also,
Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16
FCC Rcd 22781 (2001); Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent
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rates well below what the carriers consider cost-based, or what they
would demand in arm's length negotiations.77 Additionally, the FCC

has eliminated traditional common carrier regulatory burdens for
carriers providing Internet access and services. The FCC has
eliminated such "legacy" technologies as the copper wire, local loop
that provided the conduit for regulated services.78 Collectively these
deregulatory initiatives have freed incumbent carriers of having to

share and interconnect facilities providing information services, or to
provide these facilities on a nondiscriminatory and rate regulated

basis.
In light of such deregulatory fervor it comes as somewhat of a
surprise to see the FCC weigh in on the network neutrality debate at
all. In a non-binding, non-compulsory Policy Statement the FCC has

articulated four "principles":

Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98- 147, Report and
Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd
16978 (2003), corrected by Errata, 18 FCC Rcd 19020 (2003), vacated and remanded in
part,affirmed in part, United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004),
on remand, Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Review of the Section 251
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 04-313,
CC Docket No. 01-338, Order on Remand, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533 (2005).
77. The FCC has required incumbent local exchange carriers to offer competitor
access to network facilities and services on the basis of a Total Element Long Run
Incremental cost analysis. "TELRIC obliges both incumbents and state regulators to set
prices based on the long-run costs that would be incurred to produce the services in
question using the most-efficient telecommunications technology now available, and the
most efficient network configuration. Incumbents that have aging and inefficient
equipment thus must sell for less than their historical cost; the old system that calculated
rates based on actual cost of equipment plus a reasonable rate of return on capital is out
the window." AT&T Communications of Illinois, v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. 349 F.3d
402, 405 (7th . Cir. 2002). The FCC expects to eliminate or reduce the application of
TELRIC pricing. See Review of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Pricing of
Unbundled Network Elements and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, WC Docket No. 03-173, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 18945
(2003).
78. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC 05-150,
2005
WL 2347773
(rel.
Sep.
23,
2005),
available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-150Al.doc; see also, National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005)
affirming Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment
for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185 & CS
Docket No. 02-52, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd
4798 (2002).
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(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content

of their choice;
(2) consumers are entitled to run applications and services of
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement;
(3) consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal
devices that do not harm the network; and
(4) consumers are entitled to competition among network
providers,
•
79 application

and service providers,

and

content

providers.
The FCC's four Network Freedoms appear noncontroversial, but

they have no impact on the pricing, interconnection and QOS
differentiation under their current status as policy objectives.'
However, the Commission has intervened where a wireline telephone
company deliberately blocked-as opposed to degraded-VolP
traffic terminations. In Madison River Communications, LLC,81 the
Commission fined a telephone company and ordered it not to block
79. United States Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, FCC Adopts
Policy
Statement
(Aug.
5,
2005),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-260435Al.doc.
80. Similarly the FCC may not enforce the network neutrality commitments made by
AT&T as last minute concessions to secure approval of its merger with BellSouth. In a
letter to the FCC, AT&T proposed to embrace the FCC's four Network Freedoms for 30
months running from the merger closing date, and to apply network neutrality principles
for its broadband Internet access services running between subscribers and the first
Internet exchange point for a period of two years running from the merger closing date or
upon the effective date of federal legislation. AT&T expressly reserved the option not to
apply network neutrality principles for its Internet Protocol Television ("IPTV") service
and for link beyond the first Internet Exchange point. The commitment does not provide
specifically whether these conditions exempt AT&T from a network neutrality
commitment for any fiber optic broadband link that might also offer IPTV. AT&T
BellSouth
Merger
Approval,
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-269275Al.pdf.
To make matters even more murky FCC Chairman Martin and Republican Commissioner
Tate issued a statement on the merger stating that they consider the FCC not bound by all
of the concessions allegedly extracted by the Democratic Commissioners: "Importantly,
however, while the Democrat Commissioners may have extracted concessions from
AT&T, they in no way bind future Commission action. Specifically, a minority of
Commissioners cannot alter Commission precedent or bind future Commission decisions,
policies, actions, or rules. Thus, to the extent that AT&T has, as a business matter,
determined to take certain actions, they are allowed to do so. There are certain conditions,
however, that are not self-effectuating or cannot be accomplished by AT&T alone. To the
extent Commission action is required to effectuate these conditions as a policy going
forward, we specifically do not support those aspects of the conditions and will oppose
such polices going forward." AT&T BellSouth Merger Approval, Joint Statement of
Chairman Kevin J. Martin and Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate (Dec. 29, 2006),
availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-269275A2.doc.
81. Madison River Communications, LLC, Order, DA 05-543, 20 FCC Rcd 4295
(2005), availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-05-543Al.pdf.
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VoIP traffic terminations. Arguably, the consumer entitlement to
competition among software application providers, such as VoIP
ventures, means that the Commission considers network neutrality a
viable concept at least where compulsory common carriage
responsibilities continue to apply as in the case with local wireline
telephone companies.
IX. Whether and When Network Neutrality Principles and
Possibly Regulations Are Necessary
Advocates for network neutrality appropriately note the synergy
and serendipity achieved when the Internet operates as a network of
networks and offers consumers seamless, global connectivity based on
best efforts routing and reciprocal carriage agreements among ISPs.
Consumers enjoy an incredible value proposition when they can
access the Internet on an unmetered, AYCE basis and acquire
attractive content subsidized by advertisers who can exploit the
AYCE subscription option by adding to the downloaded packet
payload. The high value proposition offered to consumers jibes with
the Nethead philosophy about making the Internet ubiquitous with
more emphasis on connectivity and with less regard for cost recovery
and analysis of cost causation.
Netheads helped create the Internet and the initial reciprocal,
zero payment peering models. At the Internet's inception, Netheads
could emphasize connectivity over cost, because governments
sponsored incubation efforts as both underwriters and anchor
tenants." As governments have largely eliminated their financial
sponsorship and as Bellhead-dominated telecommunications carriers
seek to recoup their Internet investment, cost causation and cost
recovery have become substantially more important.
The net neutrality versus net bias debate focuses on what
strategies and tactics in accounting for costs and recovering them are
reasonable and fair versus anticompetitive and unjustified.
Unreasonable net bias occurs when an ISP pursues a discrimination
strategy against a specific type of bitstream or generator of a
bitstream without a reasonable and fair minded financial or
operational justification. ISPs can and should drop packets based on
congestion and the inability to route bits. Net bias occurs when an ISP

82. See, Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard
Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts and Stephen Wolff, A Brief
History

of

the

Internet,

Internet

http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml.

Society,

available

at
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drops packets or denies access-even when contractually obligated to
provide it-based on artificially induced conditions that simulate
congestion, despite the fact that ample capacity exists to switch and
route the traffic.
Net bias does not occur simply when ISPs elect to offer end users
different throughput speeds and even a daily or monthly quota of
permissible throughput. Likewise, net bias does not occur when an
ISP negotiates different interconnection and access arrangements
with upstream peers and clients. Net bias does not even occur when
an ISP deliberately partitions bandwidth so that a "private" or
premium routing option exists. However, net bias does occur when an
ISP engages in tactics designed to render "public" peering and transit
routes congested, unreliable, or blocked despite the fact that ample,
unpartitioned capacity to switch and route the traffic remains
available.
X. Permissible Network Bias
Advocates for network flexibility correctly state that external,
non-market driven constraints on their ability to price discriminate
can adversely impact their incentive to invest in broadband
infrastructure and their ability to recoup that investment. ISPs have
avoided common carrier responsibilities and the Internet largely
functions as a product of countless interconnection arrangements
flexibly negotiated and executed free of government oversight. ISPs
correctly note that only in rare instances has an interconnection
dispute triggered allegations of anticompetitive practices and rarely if
ever has a consumer lost access to a content source or addressee as a
result of network inaccessibility or balkanization."
XI. Variable Bandwidth and Throughput
Network flexibility in pricing, service provisioning and QOS
makes economic sense and does not violate a reasonable expectation
of network neutrality. ISPs should have the option of offering end
users, peers and transit clients options as to the amount of available
throughput. Just as airlines offer first, business, and economy seating
and car drivers have free and toll highway options, Internet
consumers should have access to different Internet experiences.
Variable throughput options already exist upstream from end users to
83.

Threats of "depeering" occasionally occur as do temporary denials of service. See,

e.g., Level 3 Depeers Cogent, THE REGISTER,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/06/level3-cogent/.

Oct.

6,

2005,

available at
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peers and transit clients who reciprocate with connectivity at a
specified bandwidth, or pay for a specific amount of connectivity.
XII. Bandwidth Partitioning
Absent contractual commitments with peers and transit clients to
provide a specific level of service and throughput, an ISP also should
have the option of partitioning its available bandwidth. Partitioning
enables a facilities-based ISP to meet different levels of peering
requirements as well as to offer transit clients different amounts of
throughput. If an ISP can engineer a complete route, whether via its
own facilities, or network capacity allocated to it by another carrier,
the ISP can offer end-to-end, 0OS performance guarantees at a
premium price.
Partitioning
constitutes
legitimate
price
and
quality
discrimination, even if the remaining public, non-premium
throughput declines. Net bias occurs if and only if the ISP deliberately
degrades service on public peering and transit links, despite ample
network capacity to offer uncongested switching, routing and packet
transmission.
XIII. Metered Service
ISPs do not violate a reasonable sense of net neutrality by
migrating consumers to metered Internet access. While metering
would reduce the value proposition to consumers Internet AYCE
access should not be a government mandated right. Metering satisfies
the Bellhead quest for cost attribution and recovery and surely would
force consumers to rethink their usage patterns and tolerance for
unsolicited content, the core financial model for subsidizing consumer
access to desired content.
Metering and caps on throughput might create new and possibly
lower price points for occasional users. However, the Bellhead
experience with local wireline, plain old telephone service and many
types of wireless packages confirm that few consumers like having to
think about the number of calls they make and their minutes of use.
XIV. Better Than Best Efforts Routing
Despite a Nethead heritage of a one size fits all Internet, ISPs
already have diversified the terms and conditions under which they
switch, route and transport the packets generated by a third party
content provider, or another ISP. Better-than-best-efforts routing is
not a contradiction, or unreasonable discrimination against content
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generators, consumers or ISPs that elect not to pay for superior

treatment. However, an ISP may not unilaterally change the terms of
interconnection that would violate an otherwise enforceable contract
or Service Level Agreement.
XV. Deliberate Packet Loss
Probably the most troubling scenarios of unfettered network bias
lies in the potential for seemingly legitimate QOS, interconnection
and pricing discrimination to obscure, unfair trade and

anticompetitive practices. Internet protocols have a built in system for
managing congestion, but ISPs appear to have the ability to create or
simulate congestion and the necessity for dropping packets when no
real congestion takes place. False congestion ' to punish, discipline or

competitively outmaneuver competitors, or customers refusing to pay
newly imposed surcharges, appears the same as the manufacture of
congestion by energy traders keen on artificially raising prices."
Existing peering and transit agreements may lack a specific
prohibition of deliberate packet loss, based on the presumption that
best efforts routing implies nondiscrimination. Because ISPs in the
future may have the option of offering biased and discriminatory

network routing, regulatory or judicial remedies may be needed to
foreclose and punish deliberate degradation of service, particularly
when packet loss and other strategies are directed at specific content

providers

84. ISPs surely should have the option of offering a premium peak service that would
offer higher likelihood of undropped packets and timely delivery even under truly
congested conditions. See, Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of
Congestion,
VANDERBILT UNIV. LAW SCH. LAW & ECON., Working Paper, 05-28 (2005), availableat

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=825669.
85. "So Enron was also responsible for some of California's power crisis! What was
then a profoundly corrupt enterprise manipulated the Golden State's power market to
help create artificial shortages that would jack up prices. A particularly repellent example
of this enterprise was Enron's so-called Death Star strategy, which, as a company memo
put it, let Enron be paid 'for moving energy to relieve congestion without actually moving
any energy or relieving any congestion.' In one case, Enron bought power in California at
a capped price of $250 a megawatt hour and resold it in Oregon for $2,500. The company
also "laundered" electricity to avoid federal price caps." Providence Journal-Bulletin
(May 22, 2002) (retrieved from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe).
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XVI. Targeting Large Volume Content Generators for
Punishment or Extortion
Several senior managers of incumbent telecommunications
carriers have derided high volume content generators, such as
Google, as free riders of the carriers' broadband networks.86 Even as
these managers imply that they can prioritize bitstreams, one
' articulated concerns
representative has labeled as "chicken littles"87
about the adverse impact of a tiered Internet.8
Incumbent carriers have presented quite a mixed message. On
one hand they have achieved incredible deregulatory success by
representing the robustly competitive nature of the broadband
Internet access marketplace. This environment does not yet exist in
light of the current 99.4% broadband market share the FCC itself has
calculated for cable modem and DSL service.89 Nevertheless, the
presumption of robust competition emboldens the incumbent carriers

86. Marguerite Reardon, Cnet, News of Change, Qwest CEO Supports Tiered
Internet
(March
15,
2006),
available
at
http://news.com.com/Qwest+CEO+supports+tiered+Internet/2100-1034_36050109.html?tag=nl [hereinafter cited as Qwest comments]; "William L. Smith, Chief
Technology Officer for Atlanta-based BellSouth Corp., told reporters and analysts that an
Internet service provider such as his firm should be able, for example, to charge Yahoo
Inc. for the opportunity to have its search site load faster than that of Google Inc."
Jonathan Krim, Executive Wants to Charge for Web Speed Some Say Small Firms Could
Be Shut Out of Market Championed by BellSouth Officer, WASHINGTON POST,
December 1, 2005; Page D05, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/30/AR2005113002109.html;
cf. BellSouth
Media
Room,
Net
Neutrality
Overview,
available at
http:/Ibellsouth.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press-kit&item=74;
Arshad Mohammed,
Verizon Executive Calls for End to Google's "Free Lunch," WASHINGTON POST,
February 7, 2006; Page D01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/06/AR2006020601624.html.
87. "'We believe in finding a commercial solution to this issue. The marketplace has
tools to sort this out,' said Whitacre in response to those calling for legislated Net
neutrality. Comparing those who call for legislation to Chicken Little, Whitacre argued
that service providers do not need Congress to tell them how best to run their businesses."
Pete Comas, Whitacre Calls for Less Regulation, VOIP MAGAZINE, (March 21, 2006),
availableat http://www.voip-magazine.com/content/view/2512/.
88. One knowledgeable industry analyst deems this strategy extortion: "I think it's
probably true that companies are coming to Qwest willing to pay for better treatment on
their network," he said. "But I think they're doing it out of fear. It's legalized extortion."
(quotingJeff Pulver, CEO of Pulver.com, Qwest Comments).
89. The FCC reported that as of December 31, 2005, cable television companies
provided 62.4% of broadband high speed services in the United States with telephone
companies providing 37%. Federal Communications Commission, High Speed Services for
Internet Access: Status as of December 31, 2005 (rel. July 26, 2006), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-266596A1 .pdf
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to portray themselves as victims of thievery by the likes of Google,

eBay, and Yahoo.
On the other hand, these very carriers have threatened to engage
in practices that comes across as traditional monopolist responses to
incipient competition. True to its Bell System heritage, incumbent
telecommunications firms imply the ability and willingness to employ
anticompetitive interconnection, QOS and access pricing strategies.
Threats of surcharges or degraded service imply that incumbent
carrier managers may still operate with a Bellhead orientation that
they can continue to manage a bottleneck, engage in margin
squeezes, 9° readily meter network use and discriminate between
similarly situated traffic streams. Innovations in bit and packet
sniffing do provide the opportunity to discriminate by type of service,
(video versus email) type of network user, (transit for the customer of
another ISP or delivery for a customer) and type of packet, (content
generated by one unwilling to pay a surcharge or content generated
by one willing to pay a surcharge). Only time will tell whether
incumbent carriers pursue lawful price and service discrimination, or
unlawful practices.
Rather than threaten lawful or unlawful retaliation through
delayed, degraded and dropped packets, incumbent carriers should
market a superior Internet experience for high volume content
generators and their customers. These ventures may lack privity of
contract with companies such as Google because incumbent carriers
and their ISP affiliates may not have a direct peering or transit
agreement. Rather than alienate them with threats, incumbent
operators should come up with marketing strategies to entice these
attractive prospects customers to become customers. In any event,
both end users serving ISPs and upstream operators should face an
explicit prohibition on content provider specific QOS and packet
degradation and discrimination.

90. A margin price squeeze "refers to situations in which a vertically-integrated
dominant firm uses its control over an input supplied to downstream rivals to prevent
them from making a profit on a downstream market in which the dominant firm is also
active. The dominant firm could in theory do this in a number of different ways. It could
raise the input price to levels at which rivals could no longer sustain a profit downstream.
Alternatively, it could engage in below-cost selling in the downstream market, while
maintaining a profit overall through the sale of the upstream input. Finally, the dominant
firm could raise the price of the upstream input and lower the price of the downstream
retail create a margin between them at which a rival would not be profitable." Damien
Geradin and Robert O'Donoghue, The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and
Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector, 1 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 355, 357-58 (June, 2005).
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XVII. Port Blocking
Even the FCC appears to agree that an ISP cannot single out a
specific lawful user of the ISP's network and deny service to that user.
When an ISP agrees to peer with another ISP, or to provide transit
service over a number of "advertised routes," the ISP has
contractually committed to carry any and all packets from the other
ISP regardless of the identity and marketplace success of the other
ISP's customers. The peering or transit providing ISP may demand
more compensation or the reciprocal expansion of throughput from
other ISPs. However, the ISP should have no lawful opportunity to
deny onward packet transmission to specific customers of other ISPs,
or specific types of traffic generated by the customers of other ISPs.
Port blocking involves the conscious decision by one ISP to deny
onward transmission of traffic, or delivery of traffic, to an intended
recipient. An ISP engaged in port blocking might determine that most
VoIP traffic destined for a final recipient traverses one specific
routing arrangement. An ISP keen on blocking VoIP, perhaps to
shelter an access charge payment revenue stream accruing to an
affiliated telephone company, might block the known routing
configuration for unaffiliated VoIP operators. The Madison River
company pursued this strategy and the FCC fined the company.
Additionally, several cable television companies allegedly have
blocked ports, filtered IP addresses, and have pursued other means to
thwart or slow transit via their networks. 91
The FCC could fine Madison River, because the company
blocking packet delivery operated as a conventional, common carrier
telephone company subject to Title II of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended. The Commission probably would have had no
enforcement mechanism should the port blocking occur in the
92
network of a company classified as providing information services,

91. See Cybertelecom, Vonage Complaint to the FCC, News, available at
http://www.cybertelecom.org/voip/blocking.htm.
92. Information service is defined as "the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service." 47
U.S.C. § 153(20). The FCC does not apply common carrier regulation to information
service providers under Title II of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §201 et seq. The
Commission uses its ancillary regulatory power under Title I, which, for example, has been
invoked to require VolP service providers to cooperate with law enforcement authorities
regarding wiretaps and to coordinate with wireline carriers in the provision of emergency
911 access. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY.
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including VoIP and other functional equivalents to conventional
circuit switched telephony like that provided by Madison River.
Accordingly, port blocking strategies should be deemed

impermissible by telecommunications service providers and
information service providers alike absent a compelling justification,
e.g., preventing the dissemination of harmful content such as a virus. 93

Where concerns about public health and safety exist, (emergency 911
access via VoIP telephones), the FCC has refrained from relying on a
marketplace generated remedy. 9'

XVHI.

Unfair Trade Practices and Affiliate Favoritism

A telephone company and even information service providers,
such as ISPs, may look to port blocking as a way to enhance the
marketplace attractiveness of corporate affiliates, particularly if the
carrier can obscure its tactics. Technological and market convergence
as well as deregulation provide incentive for ventures to integrate
vertically and horizontally. Triple-play and quadruple-play offers that
blend wireline and wireless telephony, Internet services, and access to
video programming demonstrate that such integration can accrue
economies of scale and scope. They also create incentives for
operators to tilt the competitive playing field to the advantage of
corporate affiliates. In the absence of structural separation95 between
U. CHI. L.J. 41 (2003); James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: CreatingIt
and Limiting It, LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 15 (2003).
93. "Canadian customers of Rogers, Canada's largest cable ISP, have speculated for
months that the company has begun to block access to BitTorrent as well as the
downloading of podcasts from services such as iTunes. While Rogers initially denied the
charges, it now acknowledges that it uses "traffic shaping" to prioritize certain online
activity. As a result, applications that Rogers deems to be a lower priority may cease to
function effectively." Michael Geist, Towards a two-tier internet, BBC NEWS, Technology
(Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4552138.stm.
94. See, e.g., IP-Enabled Services and E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service
Providers, First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 10,
245 (2005).
95. Initially the FCC enthusiastically embraced structural separation as an effective
way to ensure non-discriminatory treatment between an incumbent local exchange carrier
("ILEC") on one hand, and ILEC affiliates and competitors operating in markets that
offer enhancements to basic telecommunications transmission capacity. On the other
hand, in the Second Computer Inquiry, the FCC required AT&T to provide enhanced
services, which have close similarity to information services, only through separate
subsidiaries. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), CC Docket No. 20828, Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d 384 (1980),
on reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C. 2d 50 (1980) and
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C. 2d 512 (1981),
affd sub nom. Computer and Commun. Indus. Ass'n v FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983). see also Robert M. Frieden, The Computer
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wireline, wireless and VoIP telephone affiliates and between
information and telecommunications service providers, a vertically
and horizontally integrated venture may be tempted to use packet
discrimination in ways that constitute an unfair and deceptive trade
practice.

XIX. Premium Services or Fees to Override Firewalls and
Filters
In the rush to "monetize" Internet investments all kinds of
ventures may come up with services that appear clever and promising
before their debut. One of the major ISPs, unaffiliated with an

incumbent carrier, came up with such an idea: imposing a per email
message surcharge in exchange for which the ISP would use best
efforts to deliver the message regardless of whether the ISP's

customer sought to block and filter out such content. 96 Better-thanInquiries: Mapping the Communications/InformationProcessing Terrain, 33 FED. COMM.
L. J., No. 1. pp. 55-115 (1981); Robert M. Frieden, The Third Computer Inquiry: A
Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED. COMM. L. J., No. 3. pp. 383-410 (1987). Without any
actual measurement of whether structural separation caused ILECs to operate
inefficiently or to lose operational synergies the Commission subsequently eliminated
structural safeguards. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs.
(Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 FCC 2d 958 (1986), on Recons., 2 FCC
Rcd. 3035 (1987), Amendment to Third Computer Inquiry, Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd.
3072 (1987), Amendment Computer III, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further
Recons., 3 FCC Rcd. 1135 (1988), Amendment Computer III, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 3 FCC Red. 1150 (1988), Amendment Computer III, Memorandum Opinion and
Second Recons., 4 FCC Red. 5927 (1989), rev'd California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1990), Computer III Remand Proceedings, Report and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 7719 (1990),
Computer III Remand Proceedings, BOC Safeguards, Report and Order, 6 FCC Red.
7571 (1991), California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993), BOC Safeguards Order
vacated in part and remanded, California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994),
Implementation of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11
FCC Rcd. 12,513 (1996), Computer III Further Remand Proceedings, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Red. 6040, Computer III Further Remand Proceedings,
Report and Order, 14 FCC Red. 4289 (1999), Computer III Further Remand Proceedings,
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review, 14 FCC Red. 21,628 (1999) [hereinafter Computer Ill].
See also, Michael H. Ryan, Structural Separation:A Prerequisitefor Effective Telecoms
Competition, E.C.L.R. 24(6), 241-250 (2003); David Gabel, Why is There So Little
Competition in the Provision of Local Telecommunications Services?: An Examination of
Alternative Approaches to End-User Access, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 651
(Fall 2002); T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford and Lawrence J. Spiwak, Why ADCO?
Why Now? An Economic Exploration Into the Future of Industry Structure for the "Last
Mile" in Local Telecommunications Markets, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 421 (May 2002).
96. AOL's false start probably will not prevent ISPs from seeking surcharge
payments from delivery of customer approved content. See Saul Hansell, Postage Is Due
at
5,
2006),
available
(Feb.
Sending
E-Mail,
for
Companies
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/technology/05AOL.html?ex=1296795600&en=6efa03d
Ocbface9e&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
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best-efforts delivery of spam constitutes a kind of paid-for-bit
favoritism that enriches the ISP much to the dismay and chagrin of
the ISP's customer if it results in the delivery of spam and other
unwanted content that otherwise would be filtered out of view. Such
premium delivery option should occur only when an ISP has secured
the consent of addresses to receive such content and the content
provider agrees to pay the surcharge.
In this instance AOL came to the quick realization that whatever
revenues it would generate with an email stamp or surcharge would
pale in comparison to the ill will of its customers and the potential
that they would vote with their feet and find an ISP more willing to
respect consumer firewall and filtering preferences. The incumbent
carriers readily tout consumer sovereignty as sufficiently forceful to
prevent anticompetitive and unfair trade practices. But unlike AOL,
which faces significant competition in the marketplace for providing
consumers access to Internet content, facilities-based competition for
first and last mile broadband network access lacks such competition.
Until such time as most consumers have viable and low cost
alternatives to a cable/telephone company duopoly consumers cannot
readily shift carriers when experiencing packet discrimination or
favoritism that they do not like.
XX. Unilaterally Imposing Upstream and Downstream Rules
That Violate Existing Service Level Agreements
When AT&T Chairman Ed Whitacre singled out Google as a
free rider, he suggested that his company and others should have the
option to extend rules and pricing discipline over the customers of
other carriers. No privity of contract exists between AT&T and
Google unless both carrier and customer have executed a service
agreement. Mr. Whitacre's comment appears to state the case for his
company to impose rules and charge fees for customers whose traffic
traverses AT&T as part of the complete end-to-end routing
arrangement, even though the AT&T role occurs as a result of
peering and transiting contracts with other ISPs, not Google. In other
words, existing peering and transit agreements made by AT&T entitle
Google to have its traffic delivered to an AT&T subscriber, or to
have one or more links provided by AT&T without any direct
payment from Google to AT&T.
If this comes across as unfair, consider the following
justifications. First AT&T readily agreed to this arrangement,
because for every peering agreement where AT&T has to provide
packet transport and delivery using its network it receives reciprocal
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access to the networks of a peer. Second AT&T heretofore has
offered subscribers unmetered AYCE service without regard to the
type of bits the customer seeks and who generated the bits in the first
place. If AT&T were to single out Google for inferior treatment, it
would violate its contractual commitment to its peers and transit
customers who have paid for best efforts access to AT&T's networks.
Additionally, AT&T might violate its Service Level Agreement with
customers should Google bits experience extraordinarily great loses,
delays, and access difficulties. Lastly, AT&T has agreed to support
global access and seamless network connectivity presumably because
it accrues equal or greater utility, value, and benefit for itself and its
customers versus that accrued by other ISPs and their customers.
AT&T can impose special rules on Google if and only if all
intermediary carriers similarly agree to enforce these rules and to
offer any superior network performance offered by AT&T.
Practically speaking AT&T may not be able to impose rules
unilaterally across networks operated by others. However, if it were
to attempt to do so regulation may be necessary to limit such rule
setting to instances where AT&T can engineer a complete end-to-end
routing using its own facilities, or the facilities of other carriers that
readily agree to sniff Google packets and offer superior service for a
premium rate. AT&T and all other ISPs should not have the option
of seeking to engineer a deliberately inferior end-to-end routing
experience for Google as a way to punish, or competitively
disadvantage a single network user.

XXI. Conclusions and Recommendations
In light of the enormous stakes involved, the debate about net
neutrality has triggered emotional responses from both sides. In
response to relaxed regulation and the lost revenues from core
wireline telephony, incumbent carriers have embraced the Internet as
the primary focal point for services and profits going forward. These
carriers have offered Internet access to end users at quite attractive,
possibly subsidized rates. Having made the infrastructure investment
and having acquired substantial market share for the first and last
mile of Internet access, incumbent carriers predictably want to
generate more revenues by offering subscribers additional Internetmediated services. In light of a maturing Internet access marketplace,
these carriers also want to eliminate any early market development or
promotional pricing.
In seeking to migrate customers to traditional metered
arrangements incumbent carriers seek to calibrate more closely
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wholesale and retail charges with cost causation. But in doing so
incumbent carriers may reduce consumers' perceptions of the value in
an Internet access subscription, particularly if no AYCE option
remains. Incumbent carriers continue to offer AYCE for basic
telephony because consumers expect this option and because
unmetered service makes economic sense when the incremental cost
of an additional call triggers insignificant additional costs outside of
peak periods of congestion. Few telephone subscribers, even low
volume and poor subscribers, willingly substitute a metered option for
AYCE, despite the potential for a lower monthly bill.
Incumbent carriers also have failed to make a credible argument
that large content providers have become free riders. Content
providers, such as Google, pay for direct access to the Internet via
geographically dispersed web hosting and traffic interchange points.
It appears that incumbent carriers have picked the wrong fight with
the wrong type of Internet user. If the Internet offers ample routing
diversity and carrier options, vilified content providers, such as
Google, can vote with their dollars and secure paid peering and
transit agreements with competitors of incumbent carriers.
One would think incumbent carriers would want to load their
facilities and recoup sizeable investment with Google's traffic. This
view extends to last mile terminations of Google traffic because some
significant part of a consumer's decision to pay for incumbent carrier
provided broadband access is based on the expectation of having high
speed access to content supplied by major Internet players such as
Google, eBay, and Yahoo as well as for peer-to-peer networking
opportunities and access to large file downloads.
On the other hand, net neutrality advocates may have overstated
the potential for the demise of the Internet as we know it. Absent
port blocking and other deliberate attempts to drop packets or
degrade traffic, much of the prospective net bias constitutes
reasonable, but probably ill-advised price discrimination. End-to-end
connectivity does not appear at risk if incumbent carriers limit their
net bias initiatives to changing the financial terms and conditions of
service to end users and upstream ISPs. Incumbent operators may
have erected higher market entry costs for content suppliers and for
new innovators and entrepreneurs, but the potential for serendipity
available to "web surfers" should remain largely unabated. However,
should a meter replace AYCE, many cost conscious consumers may
balk at allowing their computers and network connection to support
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peer-to-peer networking, and collaborative computing ventures such
as the search for extraterrestrial life and climate prediction projects.'
The possibility exists for disruption of the current quid-pro-quo
where consumers acquire access to valuable content, free of charge, in
exchange for receiving additional unsolicited advertising. In a
metered environment, or one where consumers face bandwidth or
aggregate throughput caps or quotas, the additional advertising
payload may carve out a substantial portion of a subscriber's monthly
throughput allotment. Consumers may have far less tolerance for
unsolicited, spam emails, banner advertisements, and other third
party users of the throughput if consumers directly bear the cost for
the delivery of such traffic. Net bias initiatives may accrue revenue
and efficiency gains for incumbent carriers at the risk of triggering a
significant reduction in the synergy, welfare enhancement, or surplus
accrued from an Internet access subscription.
Perhaps consumer resistance to unsolicited content may cause
incumbent carriers to come up with innovative, untraditional
payment plans similar to what Netheads offer. One option, used by
both Netheads and quasi-Bellhead cellular radiotelephone carriers
shift costs from content recipients to content generators. A "pay to
play," Calling Party Pays98 arrangement would require advertisers to
pay for content delivery in addition to content hosting just as calling
parties pay for termination of calls on wireless mobile telephone
networks in many countries with the exception of the United States.
Because paying parties may consider any surcharge as a double
payment, from both the end user and the advertiser, incumbent
carriers must offer both parties some service enhancements. For end
users an increase in the throughput quota or bit rate, and for
advertisers and content creators superior carriage from end-to-end,
i.e., from content generator, through all affiliated and unaffiliated ISP
97. SETI@home is a scientific experiment that uses Internet-connected computers in
the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence ("SETI"). Individual computer owners can
participate by running a free program that downloads and analyzes radio telescope data
thereby distributing the massive data analysis load among an extensive grid of
participants. See SETI@home available at http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/.
98. "Today in the United States, the presubscribed customer of a CMRS [commercial
mobile radio services] provider - 'the called party' - generally pays all charges associated
with incoming calls. Under CPP, a CMRS provider makes available to its subscribers an
offering whereby the party placing the call to a CMRS subscriber pays at least some of the
charges associated with terminating the call, including most prominently charges for the
CMRS airtime." Calling Party Pays Service Offering in the Commercial Mobile Radio
Services, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WNT Docket No. 97-207,
14 FCC Rcd. 10, 861 (1999) (proposing to remove regulatory obstacles to the offering to
consumers of Calling Party Pays).
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networks and onward to the last mile operated by the incumbent
carrier.
If privatization signaled the conclusion of the Internet's first,
developmental phase, then the net neutrality/net bias debate signals
the conclusion of the Internet's second, adolescent and experimental
phase. As the Bellheads have consolidated both ownership and
management of the major Tier-1 ISPs, it logically follows that their
management style and operating assumptions similarly will
predominate.

